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This thesis will conduct a historical analysis of a 
portion of the Battle of the Little Big Horn using a 
decision model . The decision model is a variant of the 
Course of Action (COA) analysis (also referred to as war-
gaming) outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5. 
Specifically, this study will examine the actions of 
General George Armstrong Custer and his men around what is 
now known as Custer Hill and the Custer Battlefield. Since 
all U.S. Army participants were killed, and Indian accounts 
are vague and contradictory, the specific events that led 
to this massacre remain in dispute. Various authors, 
scholars, and scientists have offered accounts that purport 
to explain how more than 2 0 0 U.S. Cavalrymen were 
slaughtered by what, historically, had been a militarily 
inferior foe. This analysis evaluates several competing 
theories and interpretations of the battle, with the 
explicit purpose of scrutinizing General Custer's decision-
making processes within each proposed theory. It also 
offers an opinion regarding which theory reconciles best 
1 
with both the historical record and the results of the war-
gaming. Finally, it examines the likely impact of 
alternative notional leadership decisions on the outcome of 
the battle in order to determine whether Custer's force 
ever had a chance for victory, or that their fate was 
sealed. 
B. RELEVANCE 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) draw heavily on prior 
operations to enhance existing doctrine and tactics. 
Although decision models and war-gaming are used for Joint 
Mission Analysis at the United States Special Operations 
Command level, those models are mostly applied to the 
planning of future operations (Collins, 1994, p. 33) . A 
neglected utility for decision models and war-gaming is its 
application in the analysis of prior operations. The 
tactical "lessons learned" from previous operations are 
often produced by groups of individuals who analyze the 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized 
before and during such operations. Using personal 
experience and subject matter expertise, these groups judge 
the merit of employed doctrine and tactics. Their 
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objective is to either validate the status quo, or make 
recommendations for changes. Decision modeling offers an 
important means of complementing the personal experience 
and expertise of SOF personnel, by facilitating the testing 
of recommended tactical modifications in a controlled 
reenactment.. of historic operations. Emphasizing . that 
decision modeling is a tool used in concert with personal 
experience and does not produce doctrine itself is 
paramount. The desired result is a presentation of this 
method of analysis that is both interesting and reassuring 
in its applicability. 
While the Battle of the Little Big Horn was not a 
"special" operation, it provides a unique venue for the 
employment of war-gaming. A full explanation of the 
decision model developed for my study of the Battle of 
Little Big Horn is included in Chapter III. The intrinsic 
mystery surrounding this battle has stimulated interest of 
a broad spectrum of professions and disciplines for several 
generations. Additionally, several minor engagements take 
place within the background of the larger battle, 
demonstrating relevance to small units, such as Special 
Operations Forces. The general techniques and procedures 
used to model the Battle of the Little Big Horn can easily 
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be utilized to analyze an urban hostage rescue or an over 
the beach raid, at a level of detail that is useful to SOF. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The Great Sioux War. was " ... a. lengthy, .. disjointed 
struggle between the U.S. Army and allied tribes of Teton 
Sioux and Northern Cheyenne Indians that occurred in the 
span of fifteen months between March 1876 and May 1877." 
(Greene, 1993, p. xv) The conflict took place over a large 
portion of the Northern Plains, encompassing what are now 
parts of Montana, the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Wyoming. The 
war included fifteen battles of "varying magnitude and 
intensity", and the Battle of the Little Big Horn was the 
most prominent clash of the war (Greene, 1993, p. xv) . 
The primary source of conflict that led to the war was the 
whites' violations of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 
which gave the Indians exclusive rights to the land in and 
around the Black Hills of the Dakota Territory. The 
possibility of gold and pressure from land-hungry settlers 
provided the impetus for the Army to violate the treaty by 
conducting a series of expeditions into the area in the 
summer of 1874. General George Armstrong Custer led these 
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expeditions, and the reports he wrote indicated the 
presence of substantial amounts of gold and natural 
resources, as well as the overwhelming natural beauty of 
the area. By 1875 the United States Government was 
insisting that the Sioux sell their interests in the Black 
Hills. A sufficient number of Sioux were willing to agree 
to the sale of the Black Hills to make an official 
agreement possible. A subsequent play by the government to 
include in the agreement most of the remaining Sioux 
hunting grounds, known as the unceded terri tory, caused a 
rupture within the Indian groups. The majority of Sioux 
saw this attempt by the U.S. Government to grab the 
remaining unceded Indian terri tory in Wyoming and Montana 
as the end of their freedom, and resisted the official 
overtures from Washington. The discord among the Indians 
on this issue precluded the possibility of a legal 
transaction that could secure the Black Hills for the 
United States. Throughout this time, white settlers were 
streaming into the Black Hills and the surrounding area; by 
the spring of 1876 there were over fifteen thousand whites 
in the Black Hills area alone. Historian Stephen Ambrose 
says, "The United States Government was embarrassed, not at 
the way its citizens were violating the treaty but by its 
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failure to obtain some legal excuse to take the Hills." 
(Ambrose, 1975, p. 394) 
In late 1875 President U.S. Grant ordered all Indians 
back onto their reservations and off their hunting grounds. 
The order was accompanied by the threat of violence, a de 
facto declaration of war if the Indians chase. to .. ignore the 
order. Obviously the U.S. surrendered hope of a peaceful, 
legal acquisition of the land. Under the pretense of 
protecting the Crows, another Indian tribe, from Sioux 
raiding parties, the government upped the ante and actually 
declared war on the Sioux just a short time later. As the 
deadline for the Indians to return to their reservations 
passed, the issue was turned over to the War Department 
(Brady, 1904, p. 183). 
1. The Road to Little Big Horn 
General George Armstrong Custer, as commander of the 
7th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, led his unit out of Fort Abraham 
Lincoln on May 17, 1876. Custer's regiment was an element 
of a larger force commanded by Brigadier General Alfred H. 
Terry, whose charter was to locate and return all Sioux and 
Northern Cheyenne to their respective reservations. Major 
Marcus Reno, one of Custer's officers, " ... discovered a big 
Indian trail leading westward toward the Big Horn country." 
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(Brady, 1904, p. 218) Those reports persuaded General 
Terry to detach Custer and his regiment from the column in 
an effort to trap the Indians. Custer's regiment contained 
approximately 600 men (Fox, Jr., 1993, p. 25). It was task 
organized into 12 companies. Custer would decide how those 
companies were grouped for the battle later in a somewhat 
ad hoc fashion. Custer refused the offer of four companies 
from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He also opted to leave 
behind his own Gatling gun platoon, believing they were 
"too cumbersome." (Welch, 1994, p. 127) The basic plan was 
for General Terry, with an infantry regiment and a cavalry 
regiment, to follow the Yellowstone River South to the 
Little Big Horn, and then proceed south along that river. 
Custer would move to the south of Terry, along Rosebud 
Creek, then cross the Little Big Horn. The objective was 











Figure 1-1. General Terry's Plan 
2. Custer's March 
On June 22nd, the 7th Cavalry struck out to the south 
along Rosebud Creek. Two days later, the regiment 
encountered physical evidence of a large Indian contingent 
on the move. A trail, described as "more than a mile wide" 
(Connell, 1984, p. 267) 1 suggested the movement of 
thousands of Indians toward the Little Big Horn. This 
evidence was corroborated by Crow scouting reports, fixing 
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the location of the Sioux in the Little Big Horn Valley. 
After up setting camp on the evening of the 24th, Custer 
dispatched Lieutenant Charles Varnum and the Indian scouts 
to verify the presence of morning campfires in the Little 
Big Horn Valley. Eager to engage the enemy, Custer broke 
camp around 11 P.M. and led his regiment on a night march 
towards the Little Big Horn. It is important to note that 
the regiment had traveled some eighty miles in the last 
three days, on a limited amount of rest. Four hours later, 
at approximately 3 A.M., Custer ordered an extended break 
for the regiment. At this time, he received a report from 
Lt. Varnum confirming the existence of the suspected Indian 
camp. 
The regiment was mobilized at approximately 8 A.M. on 
the 25th to begin making their way toward the river. 
Custer rode ahead to see firsthand the signs of the Indian 
encampment. Unfortunately, when he arrived at the Crow' s 
Nest, an ancient vantage point about fifteen miles east of 
the Little Big Horn, " ... a haze had settled over the Little 
Big Horn and he could see nothing". (Ambrose, 1975, p. 431) 
Custer then returned to the regiment, which was hal ted at 
the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn, and 
received reports of possible sightings of Sioux scouts. At 
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this point 1 he made the decision to attack immediately. 
His primary concern/ it is clear 1 was that his approaching 
force had been spotted. Custer believed this would result 
in a dispersal of the Indian camp if he did not engage them 
as soon as possible. It was this belief that drove Custer 
toward the Indians/ without considering the possibility of 
defeat. 
In perhaps a manner that could have foreshadowed the 
confusion to come 1 Custer issued ad hoc orders to his 
company commanders (Graham 1 1995/ pp. 135/ 157/ 211). 
Captain Frederick Benteen and Companies D 1 H 1 and K were 
ordered to the south/ presumably to cut off any escape 
routes in that direction. A packtrain of supplies and 
ammunition was guarded by Captain Thomas McDougall 1 s 
Company B 1 as well as small contingents from each of the 
other companies 1 and lagged behind the advancing columns. 
The rest of Custer/ s regiment continued towards the river 1 
travelling along what is now known as Reno Creek. Another 
possible sighting of Sioux scouts compelled Custer to 
further split his forces/ as he ordered Major Reno and 
Companies A1 G 1 and M to cross the river and attack the 
Indian camp from the south. Meanwhile 1 Custer would move 
10 
,----------------------------------------~-
north along the river and, as he vaguely reassured Reno, 











'' Cllster' s Rcute 
Reno' s Ra.rt:e 
( _/// Benteen' s Rru!oe 
~~---------------~~,'' 
Figure 1-2. 7th Cavalry Approach to Little Big Horn 
3. Reno's Battle 
Major Reno crossed the Little Big Horn roughly two 
miles south of the Indian camp. He advanced toward the 
camp and set up a skirmish line about a half-mile from the 
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southernmost edge of the Indian concentration. Allegedly, 
Reno did not initiate a full charge into the Indian camp, 
as ordered, due to strong resistance (Graham, 1995, p. 
213) . The Indians responded by attacking Reno,s line, 
gradually making their way both around his left flank and 
toward the river. Perhaps fearing a loss of routes back to 
Custer, Reno ordered his men back toward the river into a 
wooded area. Once Reno, s troops were in the forest, the 
Indian attack strengthened. In the face of growing 
pressure, Reno then initiated a haphazard retreat across 
the river, onto some high bluffs. The retreat quickly 
turned into a rout, devoid of any tactical coherence. In 
the ensuing confusion, nearly 30 men were killed and a 
dozen or so left stranded in the woods (Graham, 1994, p. 
4 7) . 
4. Custer's Initial Actions 
Custer and the remaining companies (C, E, F, I, and 
L), approximately 210 men in all, headed north after 
parting company with Reno. Travelling just behind the high 
bluffs parallel to the river, it is unclear whether or not 
Custer ever saw the size of the camp or any of Reno, s 
actions. He did receive messengers from Reno, sent off in 
the early stages of that battle, indicating the size and 
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disposition of the Indian force (Graham, 1994, p. 41). 
Around this time, Custer sent two messages of his own. The 
first was to Captain McDougall and the packtrain, ordering 
him to his position with the ammunition packs. The second 
message was to Benteen with the now infamous words written 
by Custer's adjutant, Lieutenant William Cooke: "Benteen -
Come on - Big Village - Be Quick - Bring Packs. 
Cooke. P.S. Bring Pacs." (Graham, 1994, p. 54) 
5. Benteen Happens Upon Reno 
w. w. 
Benteen had been slowly making his way north toward 
the main group, after finding nothing to the south. He was 
met by Custer's messenger, and shortly thereafter, arrived 
in the area of Reno's retreat. Upon seeing the condition 
of Reno's remaining contingent, Benteen decided Reno's 
situation was more urgent than Custer's and remained there. 
Benteen dispatched another messenger to the packtrain to 
hasten the ammunition packs to the Reno-Benteen 
Battlefield. The combined group set up a defensive 
position in the face of sporadic, ineffective Indian 
attacks. After approximately 30 minutes, Captain Thomas 
Weir, one of Reno's company commanders, initiated an 
independent movement of one company towards Custer's 
presumed location. Weir, it appears, was incensed by the 
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decision to disregard Custer's requests for support, heard 
gunfire indicative of a battle, or both. What started as a 
quasi-mutinous act by one company commander, quickly 
gathered momentum (Graham, p. 139). After the 
packtrain arrived at the Reno-Benteen Battlefield, 3 more 
companies joined Weir, followed by the remaining troops. 
This group advanced perhaps % of a mile, to a position of 
high ground now known as Weir Point. This vantage point 
offered a partial view of the Custer Battlefield, roughly 
three miles away. According to subsequent testimony, smoke 
and dust impeded their view of the action. Statements 
indicate, however, that remote figures were observed moving 
across the ridge and firing into the ground (Graham, 1995, 
p. 161). Before this group could gather itself and move 
toward the Custer Battlefield, they were forced back to the 
Reno-Benteen Battlefield area under mounting Indian 
pressure. The Reno-Benteen command formed a defensive 
perimeter and held off intermittent Indian attacks for the 
next 30-36 hours. Reno would lose almost 60 men under his 
command before the fighting ended (Graham, 1994, pp. 91-
92) . 
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6. What Happened to Custer? 
The five companies detailed to Custer were completely 
decimated between 3 and 4 miles from the Reno-Benteen 
Battlefield. The details of Custer's actions, after 
dispatching the last survivor of his group to Benteen, are 
where consensus dissolves and controversy begins. We know 
how the battle began, and we know how it ended. What 
happened in the interim has been a source of speculation 
and continuing controversy for the past 123 years. The 
Battle of the Little Big Horn, specifically the ~Last 
Stand" on Custer Hill, is one of the most chronicled 
battles in history. Battle reconstructions and analyses 
include romantic semi-fiction, oral historical records, 
pure speculation, archaeological interpretations, and any 
combination thereof. Today, the challenge that faces 
anyone daring to venture into the saturated market of 
Little Big Horn literature is to add meaningful insight by 
building upon the best theory or theories available. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Selection of Theories 
The first step in this study is the selection of 
theories that are appropriate for the modeling process. 
The modeling process requires a theory that does more than 
state the obvious facts and offers a vague summary of what 
might have happened during the disputed stages of the 
battle. This thesis established three key criteria for the 
selection of theories for modeling. 
have a sufficient level of detail. 
First, the theory must 
In order to construct 
the model consistent to the source theory, the theorist 
must have offered details concerning the movement/location 
of Custer's force prior to the battle, the size of the 
Indian force, the location where the actual fighting 
started, and the movement of both sides during the battle. 
Any theory without these variables would rely too much on 
independent extrapolation or assumptions of the modeler. 
Second, the theory must be an academic effort, with either 
science or primary and secondary sources as its foundation. 
Given the extensive collection of Little Big Horn 
literature, many theories are pure conjecture and selection 
from among those would be arbitrary at best. Last, the 
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theories selected must be dissimilar enough to present an 
interesting cross section of informed analysis on the 
subject. Additionally, this will allow for the greater 
possibility of divergent results from the modeling process 
and render ranking the theories by plausibility more 
conspicuous. Theories meeting these three criteria will 
enhance the quality of the analysis. 
2. Building the Foundations for the Model 
Chapter 5 of Army FM 101-5 is titled The Military 
Decision-Making Process (MDMP) . One of the undertakings of 
the MDMP is " ... to thoroughly examine numerous friendly and 
enemy courses of action (COAs)" (Army FM 101-5, p. 5-1) 
The examination of friendly and enemy COAs is used to 
logically reach decisions at critical points in planning 
operations. The analysis of COAs can take place within 
several methods offered in Chapter 5 qf FM 101-5. The most 
appropriate technique ·for this 





synchronization of COA' s " ... across time and space in 
relation to enemy COA." (Army FM 101-5, p. 5-19) The 
matrix is set up as with an operational timeline across the 
top row and a description of key events down the left 
column. The events column can include enemy actions, 
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required decision points, and friendly maneuver and support 
activities (Army FM 0101-5, p. 5-20). A typical example of 
the Synchronization Matrix is offered as Table 1-1. Within 
this framework, each individual theory will be war-gamed. 
A detailed discussion of the specific war-gaming process 
for this study is included in Chapter III. 
Time -6 hr -2 hr 0 hr I +2 hr +6 hr +12 hr 
Enemy Fortify Artillery Retreat 
actio defensive barrage 
n positions 
Dec is Select Determine Select Halt 
ion attack vulnerable envelopment pursuit 
Point point points route 
s 
Secur Move Secure 
ity to set lines of 
point advance 
Deep Recon Move Attack Move to 
routes to set artillery envelopme 
point positions nt route 




Reser Prepare for Move toward Consolidate 
ve movement vulnerable prisoners 
points 
Log is Establish ammo Move ammo Consolidate 
tics supply points supply points prisoners 
forward 
Table 1-1. Example of Synchronization Matrix (FM 101-5) 
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3. Evaluation Criteria 
According to FM 101-5, evaluation criteria " ... are those 
factors the staff uses to measure the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other 
COAs following the war game."(p. 5-18) Suggested criteria 
include the principles of war, doctrine, commander's 
intent, and risk factors. Another key consideration for 
the matrix will be the operational history of and 
tendencies exhibited by Custer. Custer may not have 
applied actions prescribed by general military rules of war 
against a numerically superior force because of prior 
experiences with the Indians, and his own proclivity to 
attack regardless of enemy strength. Stephen Ambrose 
relates Custer's reputation from the Civil War, " ... Custer 
had one basic instinct, to charge the enemy wherever he 
might be, no matter how strong his positions or numbers." 
(p. 195) Furthermore, Custer was of the opinion that 
Indians, regardless of numbers, were simply unable to stand 
up to the firepower of cavalry. (Ambrose, p. 283) The last 
criteria will consider Custer's prior engagements with 
Indian warriors to be a contributing factor to both his 
assumptions regarding the enemy and his subsequent COAs. 
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This thesis will use the COA analysis in two ways. 
First, the COA's attributed to Custer by each of the 
individual authors will be examined to determine how well 
the expected results correspond with the historical record, 
the author's sequence of events, as well as independent 
assumptions drawn from known variables of the battle. The 
study of each theory will facilitate the ranking of the 
theories by degree of plausibility. Second, COA analysis 
will allow the testing of alternative decisions by Custer 
at several stages of the battle, in an effort to ascertain 
whether or not the 7th Cavalry had a fighting chance to win, 
or if their demise was inevitable. Specifically, three 
alternative scenarios will be tested. The first is a 
massed attack on the Indian camp, with Custer and Reno's 
forces together: Second, the Benteen's battalion is 
dispatched toward Custer's position, bypassing Reno Hill in 
order to link the two groups. Last, several casualty 
thresholds are tested in conjunction with a Custer retreat 
toward Reno and Benteen's position to determine if and 
until what point retreat may have been an option. 
Modeling the Battle of Little Big Horn using a 
decision model will not provide a crystal ball solution to 
the mystery of Custer's Last Stand. However, it will put 
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the chosen theories through a rigorous examination designed 
to determine the feasibility of each. The conclusion of 
this thesis will add credibility to the theories or theory 
whose assumptions can be reconciled with history through 
decision modeling. 
21 
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II. BATTLE OF LITTLE BIG HORN THEORIES 
The theories selected for this modeling effort were 
chosen after an extensive review of both the classic and 
current literature. Stephen E. Ambrose wrote a dual 
biography of . General Custer and Crazy Horse, Crazy Horse. 
and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors, 
which culminates with the historic clash on the Little Big 
Horn River. While Ambrose's work lacks the meticulous 
analytical rigor evident in the other two works, it is 
important to include it. First, his theory is 
representative of the most widely held beliefs regarding 
the Battle of Little Big Horn. Specifically, the 
fatalistic theme that Custer was trapped from the moment he 
engaged the Indians on Custer Battlefield is widely 
supported among Custer historians. Second, his version 
draws from the most respected earlier accounts, and can be 
considered representative of the "traditional" view. John 
S. Gray penned the highly analytical work titled Custer's 
Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn 
Reconstructed. Gray's work begs to be included due to its 
painstakingly detailed reconstruction of the battle's 
timeline. Finally, Richard Allan Fox produced a superb 
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blend of archaeological science and historical research in 
Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle. It is not 
by coincidence Gray's and Fox's works were written within 
the last decade, and the Ambrose's within the last twenty-
five years. Divorced from the bias of accounts written 
immediately following the battle, and bolstered by the 
information gathered in recent times through analysis of 
both all existing documents and the battlefield itself, 
these accounts uniformly represent the finest endeavors in 
Little Big Horn scholarship. Additionally, these accounts 
provided a level of detail, reliability, and diversity 
sought from the outset. Within this chapter, the theories 
advanced by these three authors will be presented in the 
form of a narration. Highlighted will be the points that 
both distinguish the theory in relation to the others, as 
well as points most emphasized by the authors. The chapter 
will conclude with a table that distills the crucial 
aspects of each theory down to concise descriptions and 
allows the reader to contrast each theory in a snapshot. 
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A. LITTLE BIG HORN THEORY 1 - STEPHEN AMBROSE 
Stephen Ambrose paints a picture of the Battle of the 
Little Big Horn that credits the Indians with accurate 
intelligence, 
organization. 
great foresight, and unprecedented 
Ambrose's account portrays Custer as an 
unwitting victim of a clever Indian ambush, while Crazy 
Horse is seen as an opportunistic, charismatic leader who 
pulls off an exceptionally well-orchestrated tactical 
maneuver. Ambrose's theory rests on three main 
assumptions. First, the Indians had the advantage in 
battlefield intelligence. Although they were surprised by 
Reno's attack, they expected and were poised for the probe 
from Custer's forces, which is directly contrary to Fox's 
theory. Second, Crazy Horse was able to exert a unique 
amount of influence on the Indian warriors, both in scope 
and manner. Crazy Horse was able to restrain a substantial 
number of warriors from entering the skirmish with Custer's 
forces, as well as convince them to follow him on a 
circuitous route in order to surprise Custer from the rear. 
Third, Custer's tactical decisions were always one step 
behind the Indians' actions and the rapidly changing 
dynamics of the battlefield. Ambrose uses a combination of 
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interviews, classic historical accounts, and official 
government documents to construct his hypothesis. His 
theory exemplifies the conventional, romantic versions of 
Custer's Last Stand. Figure 2-1 will graphically portray 
Ambrose's version of the battle. 
1. Reno's Battle 
Reno began his trek towards the Sioux camp with the 
understanding that " ... the whole outfit would support him" 
(p. 437) in his charge on the Indians. Reno stopped his 
group before charging the camp and formed a skirmish line 
at an impracticable distance from the encampment. The 
firing that ensued from Reno's lines did little more than 
alert the Indians to Reno's presence and provoke a 
counterattack. Reno and his men were weary and unprepared 
for a protracted battle, which may explain why he ordered a 
retreat after suffering only his first casualty (p. 439). 
An unfortunate (or lucky, depending on your perspective) 
shot during a pause in the retreat splattered the brains of 
Bloody Knife, an Indian scout working for the Army, all 
over Reno. Unnerved, Reno gave an inadequate call for a 
further retreat and abandoned his group without ensuring 
full dissemination of his orders. Reno led the withdrawal 
across the Little Big Horn River and onto higher ground. 
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The disorganized retreat soon regressed into a rout with 
Reno's group taking its heaviest casualties while crossing 
the river and climbing the bluffs. Ambrose estimates the 
Reno Battle to have taken approximately thirty minutes, 
with only sporadic fighting thereafter. (p. 439) 
2. Custer's Battle 
Custer's reason for splitting his command, according 
to Ambrose, was to gain the element of surprise (p. 43 7) . 
Custer assumed strategic surprise was compromised by Sioux 
Scouts, and was endeavoring to mitigate that with a 
tactical surprise attack on the Indian camp after first 
drawing their attention to Reno's forces. Ambrose opines 
that Custer rode north after splitting from Reno, and 
signaled to them from the high bluffs as Reno began his 
attack (p. 439). This is important because at the start of 
Reno's attack Custer is still roughly two miles away from 
his first engagement with the Indians. With a generous 
estimate of five miles per hour over rough, unfamiliar 
terrain on exhausted horses, Custer was still close to 
thirty minutes away from engaging the enemy at this point, 
although it may have taken him longer. Reno's forces would 
have been disposed of and the preponderance of the Indian 
camp's attention turned towards Custer. Around this same 
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time, Custer dispatched a messenger with the now famous 
request, penned by the regimental adjutant for Benteen. 
"Benteen: Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. 
W. W. Cooke. P.S. Bring packs" (p. 439). 
Custer took the five companies of approximately two 
hundred and twenty-five men under his command North, behind 
the bluffs and out of sight of the camp, then down Medicine 
Tail Coulee toward the Little Big Horn. His plan was to 
ford the river and attack what he thought to be the rear, 
with the hope that Indian attention would be focused on 
Reno. Before Custer could make the river, Ambrose contends 
he was met by a force of some 1500 warriors who had already 
crossed to Custer's side in anticipation of his arrival. 
Custer's Battle had started. Custer recognized the 
disparity in numbers and the Indians' offensive posture as 
a signal to search out a suitable spot to dig in and wait 
for reinforcements, ostensibly on the way with Ben teen. 
(p. 440) 
Roughly a thousand Indian warriors pursued Custer and 
his men as the troopers retreated up Calhoun Ridge and 
toward Custer Hill. Crazy Horse and one thousand more 
warriors, in an uncharacteristically calculated flanking 
maneuver, made their way unnoticed to Custer's rear. As 
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Custer and almost two hundred of his men were busy engaging 
the original group of warriors in the direction of the 
river, Crazy Horse and his horde crested Custer Hill and 
Custer Ridge from the East. The ensuing massacre took 
something like twenty minutes, resulting in the death of 
every last trooper. Ambrose describes it as a disorganized 
swarm, which would have precluded the troopers from using 
any disciplined formations to their advantage. Considering 
the distance covered by Custer's forces and the intense 
fighting alleged by Ambrose, Custer's entire Battle can be 
calculated to have taken somewhere between one and a half 
to two hours. Indian casualties are estimated by Ambrose 
to have numbered no more than forty. (pp. 440-442) 
3. Ambrose's Critical Analysis 
Ambrose presents four factors that contributed 
directly to Custer's failure. Custer's first mistake was 
his refusal to accept four augmenting companies from 
General Terry (p. 444) . Ambrose contends that both the 
Reno and Custer Battles may have met with more success if 
two additional troops had been available for each element. 
The second error was a gross underestimation of the 
enemies' numbers and, more importantly, their resolve to 
fight (p. 444). Dealing with a massive number of Indians 
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presented its own problem, but Custer had no idea they 
would pick this particular meeting as their first to 
organize a large, seemingly well-coordinated offensive 
maneuver. Third, Custer did not accurately assess the 
condition of his men and their horses (p. 445). He may 
have let the thought of glory cloud his judgement in regard 
to their exhausted mental and physical states. The last 
series of errors Custer made could be characterized as poor 
generalship. Failure to conduct proper reconnaissance, 
overextension of his forces, and inadequate speed of 
decision-making are all pointed to by Ambrose as blunders 
by Custer. He caveats this scathing assessment of Custer's 
performance by adding that Crazy Horse' s noteworthy 
leadership may have had more influence on the outcome of 
the Battle of Little Big Horn than Custer's errors. In 
this sense, Ambrose seems to suggest that there was not 
much that Custer could have done to avoid his defeat, once 
the fighting was underway. (pp. 445-447) 
Ambrose supports his theory through a multitude of 
well-known historical accounts as well as recorded 
individual interviews. His is representative of the 
traditional view of the Battle of Little Big Horn, in that 
Custer is believed to have made the majority of his 
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mistakes before the battle took place. This view maintains 
that Custer had few, if any options once the fighting 
started. Ambrose's synopsis of the battle is captured in 
figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1 Ambrose Battle Map 
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• 
B. LITTLE BIG HORN THEORY 2 - RICHARD ALLEN FOX, JR. 
The theory advanced by Fox, which he supports with new 
archaeological evidence and historical facts, stresses 
three prominent aspects of the battle. First, Fox's theory 
rests on the assumption that Custer deployed his force in 
an offensive posture, ergo his forces were purposefully 
dispersed. Second, Fox asserts that Custer's forces did 
not assume a defensive posture until relatively late in the 
battle. The cause for this switch to the defense was the 
culmination of a massive, yet stealthy Indian infiltration 
coupled with a surprise attack by the fairly organized 
group of warriors with Crazy Horse. Breaking with the 
traditional flanking maneuver attributed to Crazy Horse, 
Fox has Crazy Horse and a multitude of warriors penetrating 
between two dispersed elements of Custer's force, adding to 
the confusion of the battle. Lastly, Fox portrays the 
famous "Last Stand" as the chaotic culmination of a slow 
but steady disintegration of the confidence and cohesion of 
Custer's men. Fox uses gravesites, shell casings, 
bullets, arrowheads, and other physical remains of the 
battle to reconstruct his version of the Battle of the 
Little Big Horn. The entirety of Custer's Battle can be 
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seen, through Fox, as a probing offensive action, seemingly 
unaware of the mounting threat, which switches a defensive 
posture too late. 
in Figure 2-2. 
The battle according to Fox, is depicted 
1. Reno's Battle 
Fox has Reno riding down toward the Little Big Horn 
and the Indian encampment with the understanding that 
Custer's force will support him from the rear (p. 28) . 
Whether Reno assumed this was to be accomplished by 
Custer's force following the same route, or by way of a 
separate ford further north is uncertain. Regardless, Reno 
moved toward the Indian camp from the south and dismounted 
his force to form a skirmish 1 ine. A unique feature of 
Fox's theory is his argument that the Indians were 
expecting Reno, but were unaware of Custer's presence (p. 
333) . Faced by the prospect of being cut off from Custer 
by a flanking maneuver, Reno ordered a tactical retreat to 
a wooded area near the river. Reno's force spent 
approximately 30 minutes in this position and experienced 
increasing pressure from Indian attacks. A decision by 
Reno to retreat across the river, according to Fox, 
coincided with a particularly concentrated Indian attack on 
the center of Reno's force. In the ensuing confusion, the 
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disorganized retreat, characterized as a rout, allowed the 
Indians to exact a heavy toll on Reno's command. Reno's 
remaining troops made their way up a ravine on the east 
side of the river and established a defensive position. 
Indian opposition dwindled, at this point, to sporadic 
harassment. 
2. Custer's Battle 
Contrary to what Reno might have thought, Custer and 
his contingent had set out on a deliberate path to the 
north after dispatching Reno (p. 235). Custer's battalion, 
according to Fox, was broken down into 2 functional wings. 
The "left wing" was comprised of companies E and F 
commanded by Captain Yates. The "right wing" contained 
companies I, C, and L, and was .commanded by Captain Keogh. 
An advance detail, from the left wing, preceded the main 
force down Medicine Tail Coulee (p. 333) . The left wing 
followed the advance guard, and proceeded to probe the ford 
at Medicine Tail Coulee, while the advance guard was 
dispatched to the north. The right wing remained behind in 
the vicinity of Calhoun Hill to receive Benteen and block 
any Indian penetration (p. 333) . The left wing departed 
Medicine Tail Ford without actually crossing, due to the 
sight of villagers fleeing to the north. Presumably, 
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crossing at that point would not have served to pinch the 
majority of the Indian camp between Custer's and Reno's 
battalions. Custer's two battalion wings then converged on 
Calhoun Hill. The right wing deployed L company in a 
skirmish line facing south, with the remainder in reserve. 
This skirmish line scattered groups of infiltrating Indians 
with volleys of fire (p. 225). The Indians, at this time, 
were crossing the river at several points, gradually 
filling the ravines and depressions surrounding Custer's 
troopers. The left wing continued to move along what is 
now Custer Ridge and then northwest down Cemetery Ridge 
toward the Little Big Horn. Ostensibly, the left wing was 
still attempting to find a desirable ford that would enable 
them to trap the majority of the Indians. It was during 
this extreme separation of Custer's forces that Crazy Horse 
and a multitude of warriors shot the gap between the two 
wings (p. 299) . Crazy Horse and a large group of Indians 
rode covered and concealed up Deep Ravine, and positioned 
themselves to the north of Custer's entire force. At this 
point, there was a pause in the offensive actions of the 
left wing. They may have made it as far as the river, but 
then backtracked to higher ground at the western end of 
Cemetery Ridge (p. 305). All the while, the Indians crept 
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closer and their disorganized attacks were incrementally 
mounting. Conceivably, Custer was awaiting the arrival of 
Benteen to bolster his force sufficiently to enable him to 
attack. This would serve to explain the 20 minutes spent 
in this extended offensive posture. The right wing, now 
surrounded on 3 sides, by Crazy Horse to the north and 
infiltrating warriors from the west and south, sent C 
company to the west to suppress Indian attacks from Calhoun 
Coulee and Greasy Grass Ridge. Concurrently, Custer and 
the left wing began to move up toward still higher ground 
at Custer Hill in an effort to close the distance with the 
right wing. In right wing action, C company was repelled, 
and their jumbled retreat left the right flank of L company 
exposed. L company answered this with a redeployment of 
their line to cover the retreat. 
to press forward from the south. 
This allowed the Indians 
At this time, according 
to Fox's account, Crazy Horse and his warriors brought the 
full force of their attack from their concealed 
infiltration route, and the right wing is overwhelmed and 
disintegrates. C and L company were overrun in place 
along Calhoun Hill, while Keogh and I company deployed 
along the northeast side of Custer Ridge in an attempt to 
secure a path of retreat. I company was attacked from the 
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east and the Indians cut off most of the right wing 
soldiers fleeing toward the left wing. Most of I company 
died along Custer Ridge, barely 20 troopers from I company 
made their way to Custer Hill. 
Meanwhile, the left wing had also been forced to the 
defense. E company formed a skirmish line facing west 
toward Greasy Grass Ridge and Calhoun Coulee, in response 
to the Indian activity in that direction. F company was 
holding reserve. F company's attention was diverted by the 
warriors that broke through I company and crested Custer 
Ridge. They no sooner started firing at this new threat to 
the east, Fox argues, than they are faced with a 
simultaneous attack from the west. E company then 
retreated to consolidate with F company, and both made 
their way up towards Custer Hill. This is the group that 
met the I company survivors on the west side of Custer 
Hill. 
This desperate group deployed into haphazard defensive 
positions to fight it out, surrounded now on practically 
all sides. E company initiated out a hopeless charge 
toward the river to possibly secure an escape route (p. 
220) . The remaining 50-60 troopers on Custer Hill were 
overwhelmed. Perhaps 15 men fled Custer Hill in order to 
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consolidate with the E company group in the vicinity of 
Deep Ravine, where the remainder of Custer's force was 
annihilated. Fox estimates that the duration of the 
battle, from the probe at Medicine Tail Coulee to the 
conclusion of the fighting at "Last Stand Hill" was on the 
order of 2 hours. 
3. Why the Loss? 
Fox offers a thorough critical analysis of the reasons 
behind Custer's failure. He suggests that the Indians 
released from Reno's Battle directly foiled Custer's plan 
of envelopment (p. 2 9 0) . Also, the Indians displayed a 
willingness to stand and fight that was inconsistent with 
Custer's experience (p. 234). Finally, Fox concludes that 
Custer exercised poor judgment in a rapidly changing 
environment (p. 292). Specifically, Custer failed to 
identify an infiltrating offensive by the Indians, failed 
to recognize Indian resolve, ignored the odds, and 
maintained a dispersed offensive posture until he ran out 
of options. 
Fox's theory is grounded in physical science and 
merges well with the historical record. His theory wi 11 
represent the set of theories that espouse an offensive 
posture by Custer, slow attrition, and a later and smaller 
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culmination than is traditionally promoted. Especially 
provocative are the actions attributed to Crazy Horse by 
Fox, which defy conventional thought and add an interesting 
dynamic to the battle. The battle sequence, as related by 
Fox, is presented in figure 2-2. 
6.6. 
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C. LITTLE BIG HORN THEORY 3 - JOHN S. GRAY 
John Gray appends his analysis of the Little Big Horn 
with a guarded caveat. He offers that his " ... hypothesis 
cannot qualify as a theory/ for it is only a trial 
hypothesis/ to be checked against further evidence. 11 (Gray 1 
1991/ p. 395) Gray 1 s modest qualification aside 1 his 
reconstruction of the battle through exhaustive comparisons 
of primary sources and time-motion analysis is both 
thorough and feasible. Gray/s account of the events on the 
Custer Battlefield is put together through a tightening 
circle of constraints derived from the cumulative 
comparison of " ... frequent interconnections between the 
numerous parties/ resulting from separations/ meetings/ and 
courier messages/ as well as cross-sightings and hearings. 11 
(Gray 1 1991 1 p. xv) Within these constraints Gray follows 
Custer through the most feasible courses of action with an 
additional check of viability through probable rates of 
movement. An aspect of Gray/ s account that makes it 
especially suitable for modeling is the fact that he offers 
time hacks for nearly every significant action during the 
battle. 
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Gray dubs his hypothesis the "elastic counterclockwise 
hypothesis". (1991, p. 395) This particular moniker refers 
to the direction of travel, as they were slain, of the 
entirety of Custer's force. From a nominal feint at the 
river, by one or two of Custer's companies, down Medicine 
Tail Coulee to the last desperation sprint toward Deep 
Ravine, Custer's force followed a counterclockwise path 
that left bodies strewn in a relatively uniform circular 
pattern over an area not quite a square mile. From the 
start of the feint, Gray makes it clear that Custer has no 
intention of attacking the Indian village until 
reinforcements and resupply arrive. The entire purpose of 
the feint was to draw the Indians away from Major Reno. 
However, Custer did not intend to engage the village until 
Benteen arrived. The final moments of the battle seem 
almost anticlimactic in Gray's account. While he credits 
the troopers with stiff resistance, the methodical 
attrition of the cavalry soldiers makes an Indian victory 
seem a foregone conclusion nearly from the outset. Gray's 
hypothesis breaks with the classic tradition and Ambrose's 
account in that Custer was in a semi-offensive posture 
until after the feint at the river. That offensive posture 
ends when the two elements of Custer's force link up at the 
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southeast end of the Custer Battlefield, and a retreat 
ensues. The general movement attributed to Custer's force 
is similar to that espoused by Fox, with one important 
distinction. Fox has Custer's forces spread about the mile 
square battlefield for an offensive before any significant 
fighting takes place. Gray's depiction scatters Custer's 
dead along similar lines, but as the result of a circular 
retreat. The differences may seem slight at first glance, 
but the modeling process will show differences in how the 
two scenarios play out. 
captured in Figure 2-3. 
1. Reno's Battle 
The battle according to Gray is 
The action attributed to Reno by Gray is very similar 
to the accounts offered by Fox and Ambrose. The abundance 
of survivors from this portion of the battle makes 
reconstructing these events relatively simple. The 
singular distinction of Gray's account of Reno's battle is 
the detailed timeline he offers. Through time-motion 
analysis, Gray offers a minute-by-minute account of Reno's 
actions. Most importantly, he submits specific times for 
Reno's charge(3:03), attack(3:18), and subsequent 
retreat(3:53) (Gray, 1991, p, 290). This will be critical 
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because Reno's hasty departure frees countless warriors to 
shift their attention to Custer. 
2. Custer's Battle 
As in the other two accounts, Gray has Custer heading 
north after his split with Reno. Battalion assignments 
were identical to those posited by Fox, with one exception. 
Gray places Custer with the battalion commanded by Capt. 
Keogh, while the battalion that approaches the river is 
under the control of Capt Yates. Custer got his first look 
at the Indian camp five minutes before Reno deployed his 
initial skirmish lines (p. 338) and dispatched the first of 
two messengers to Benteen. The disposition of the Indian 
camp (tepees still erected) gave Custer reason to believe 
the Indians meant to fight it out. While moving north, his 
next significant action was the dispatch the second 
messenger to Benteen, exhorting Benteen to make haste to 
Custer's position with men and supplies (p. 338). Custer's 
next call was to send a contingent of two companies down 
Medicine Tail Coulee to perform a feint assault, in order 
to alleviate the certain pressure on Reno's forces (p. 
368) . Little did Custer know, Reno's forces had already 
been routed by this point and were struggling to make it up 
toward Reno Hill. Custer continued north as his 
43 
counterfeit assault, led by Capt. Yates, moved toward the 
river. Capt. Yates followed the river north for ~ mile, 
then turned east to link up with Custer. On his return to 
Custer, Yates' contingent was pressed from both sides by 
infiltrating Indians on horseback. Custer did not have an 
uneventful ride either. Indians, crossing the river and 
infiltrating from the south were giving Custer reason for 
concern. He initiated a suppressing volley in their 
direction, and then made haste for a rendezvous with Yates 
(p. 368). The Custer and Yates groups were reunited on the 
southeastern side of the Custer Battlefield, just south of 
Calhoun Ridge. Just four minutes later the constant 
infiltration of Indians, some 1600 strong by now, reached a 
critical mass and resulted in a heavy increase in gunfire. 
Gray suggests that Custer led his force on a somewhat 
orderly retreat, evidenced by the proximity of company 
members' gravestones. The retreat led up Custer Ridge to 
Custer Hill, then on to the South Skirmish Line, with a few 
wayward souls finally attempting a dash back toward the 
south from there. The location and identification of 
gravestones indicates the order of march. This portion of 
the battle lasted approximately 35 minutes, which would 
indicate the rate of advance for Custer's troops around the 
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battlefield with fighting halts. Also integral to this 
hypothesis is the departure of more than a company's worth 
of men from Custer Hill before the final massacre began, 
and the fact that they took no casualties for over a 
hundred meters after leaving the hill. Gray proposes that 
it is quite possible that General Custer's Last Stand could 
have happened either earlier than or concurrently with the 
demise of the last of his troopers near the South Skirmish 
L·ine and Calhoun Ravine . Either way, from the time that 
Yates' force approached the river to the end of the battle 
was slightly more than an hour. Conspicuously absent in 
Gray's account is the famous end-around led by Crazy Horse, 
as the Indians are seemingly relegated to mass, 
individualized infiltration. In Gray's defense, his study 
was primarily concerned with the actions of Custer's 
forces, and he refers to an independent Indian attack from 
the north and east . This oversight of Crazy Horse's role 
seems to be a product of analytical focus rather than 
disregard. 
3. Why? 
Gray avoids directly critiquing Custer's actions, but 
a couple of inferences can be drawn from his book. First, 
Custer had no excuse for underestimating the strength of 
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the enemy. Many of the first-hand accounts used by Gray 
suggest that Custer knew early on that he was confronting 
an unusually large force. Also suspect was Custer's 
decision to split his command three separate times. In all, 
Custer's decision-making appears quite dubious. Gray 
qualifies his hypothesis as a work in progress, as he 
constructed his argument after the archaeological 
excavations had taken place at the battlefield, but before 
the results had been made public. In spite of his protests 
to not consider his work a "theory", Gray's research and 
logic produce a work that is more than worthy of further 
examination through war-gaming. 
Gray is laid out in figure 2-3. 
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The battle according to 
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Figure 2-3 Gray Battle Map 
D. COMPETING THEORIES 
• 
Each theory ascribes distinct actions and intentions 
to Custer and his forces. These differences will provide 
an opportunity for this modeling endeavor to substantiate 
and/or challenge each of these models, as well as rank them 
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by degree of plausibility. A careful examination of the 
decisions and subsequent actions attributed to Custer and 
his soldiers by each author will allow the examination of 
each theory in relation to the historical record and the 
assumptions made by this author. In order to provide a 
clearer understanding of how these theories differ, Table 
2-1 is offered as a snapshot of Fox's, Gray's and Ambrose's 
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Table 2-1. Comparison of Three Competing Theories 
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III. THE METHODOLOGY OF WAR-GAMING 
A. DEVELOPING COURSES OF ACTION (COAs) 
As stated earlier, the method chosen to analyze the 
competing theories of the Battle of Little Big Horn is the 
Synchronization Matrix of FM 101-5. In order to convey a 
clearer understanding of how it will be employed within the 
framework of my study, the following discussion of the 
purpose and structure of war-gaming, and more specifically 
the Synchronization Matrix is offered. 
The original intent of the Synchronization Matrix, 




the development of operational 
the Synchronization Matrix lays 




reactions along an operational timeline, with the express 
purpose of developing optimum friendly COAs at each 
sequential stage of battle. There are six specific steps 
suggested by FM 101-5, in the development of COAs. This 
development takes place exclusive of the Synchronization 
Matrix. They are as follows: 
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1. Analyze Relative Combat Power 
As defined by FM 101-5, combat power is the fusion of 
elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and 
leadership, in relation to enemy strength. The analysis of 
force ratios should shed light on the types of operations 
feasible against enemy forces, enemy strengths and 
weaknesses, and how to allocate friendly resources. The 
general conclusions drawn from this analysis should provide 
planners with possible COAs, but not one specific COA. 
2. Generate Options 
Based on the results of the combat power analysis, 
COAs should be generated with the explicit requirement that 
all friendly COAs advanced are. capable of defeating all 
enemy COAs. 
3. Array Initial Forces 
The ratio of friendly to enemy forces is determined, 
with the purpose of identifying the total number of 
friendly units needed. 
4. Develop Scheme of Maneuver 
This step describes how the arrayed forces will 
accomplish the mission. During this stage, generic units 
are transformed into task-oriented units ( i . e . armor, 
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infantry) . During this phase of planning, forces not 
actively employed in the main maneuver schemes may be 
earmarked as reserves and positioned accordingly. 
5. Assign Headquarters 
This step assigns headquarters to forces in a manner 
that best suits the task organization of the group as a 
whole. It also identifies special command and control 
requirements, such as crossing friendly lines or 
coordination of supporting fires. 
6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches 
The COA statement must explain each step of the 
operation, to include the expected end-state of the battle. 
The sketches should convey a clear portrayal of the 
maneuver facets of the COA. Expected enemy locations and 
command post positions should also be depicted in the COA 
sketches. 
B. THE SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX 
Once the requisite number of COAs has been developed 
for any given scenario, they are then put through a 
competitive analysis within the framework of war-gaming. 
In this thesis the framework used is the Synchronization 
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Matrix, and the COAs are represented by the three selected 
theories. The COA analysis endeavors to identify "which 
COA accomplishes the mission with minimum casualties while 
best positioning the force to retain the initiative for 
future operations." (Army FM 101-5, p. 5-16) With a few 
modifications, this thesis uses the Synchronization Matrix 
to war-game each selected Little Big Horn theory. The 
concept is to compare the war-game results with several 
preliminary assumptions made with respect to the battle. 
The theory that most closely reconciles itself, through the 
war-gaming process, with the initial assumptions advanced 
in Chapter II will be deemed most plausible. There are 
eight steps identified by FM 101-5 that are necessary in 
the construction of a Synchronization Matrix. The 
following is a description of each step, according to Army 
FM 101-5, and the manner in which it will be adapted for 
this study. 
1. Gather the Tools 
Tools required include maps of the Area of Operations, 
a method of recording events, and a method of recording 
friendly and enemy movements. The events throughout each 
theory are logged in the Synchronization Matrix, and 
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expanded dialogue is recorded in both battle maps and a 
parallel discussion of the war-gaming. 
2. List All Friendly Forces 
The friendly force list must remain consistent 
throughout all COAs. This is of no consequence, as the 
force level of Custer's group is not a point of contention 
amongst the authors. 
3. List Assumptions 
A review of the assumptions made during COA 
development ensures their validity. In this case, the 
assumptions advanced regarding the battle are points of 
reference that assess the feasibility of each author's 
theory. The assumptions made by the respective authors 
constitute the COAs for Custer's force. 
4. List Known Critical Events and Decision Points 
Army FM 101-5 defines critical events as " ... those that 
directly influence mission accomplishment." (p. 5-18) They 
can include actions that require shifts in forces, crossing 
friendly lines, or other complicated maneuvers. Critical 
events can also include casualty thresholds that indicate 
the impracticality of a COA. In this study of Little Big 
Horn theories there are junctures where each theory will 
provide information, via the war-gaming process, relative 
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to the independent assumptions. These junctures are 
considered the critical events within each theory. 
Decision points are situations that require major command 
and control judgments. Within the war-gaming of each 
individual Little Big Horn theory, both explicit and 
inferred decision points are highlighted. Only the 
critical events and decision points that distinguish each 
theory vis-a-vis the others will be evaluated. 
5. Determine Evaluation Criteria 
Evaluation criteria are the factors used to measure 
the effectiveness of one COA relative to others. The 
criteria can include the principles of war, doctrinal 
fundamentals for specific operations, and in this case, 
reconciliation with the independent assumptions regarding 
the outcome of the battle. This study is concerned with 
determining the degree to which each theory reconciles with 
three factors, not necessarily which COA may have been most 
effective. The competing theories will be judged relative 
to the Little Big Horn historical record, select hypotheses 
advanced by this study, and Custer's operational history 
and tendencies. Establishing a single, authoritative 
historical record for the Battle of Little Big Horn is 
nearly unattainable. The conflicting primary accounts and 
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interpretive nuances associated with the examination of 
physical evidence preclude the inclusion of such a 
qualification. Instead, during the war-gaming of the 
theories, each author's application of historical analysis 
will be objectively judged. The latter two criteria will 
be discussed, in detail, later in this chapter. 
6. Select the War-game Method 
As stated earlier, the chosen method will be the 
Synchronization Matrix. 
7. Select Method to Record and Display Results 
The Synchronization Matrix provides a built-in method 
of recording key battle events. In addition to the matrix, 
battle maps and a concurrent discussion of the simulated 
action details critical points .in a manner that enhances 
understanding of the sequential analysis process. 
8. War-game the Battle and Assess the Results 
Fm 101-5 describes the war game as "an action-
reaction-counteraction cycle." (p. 5-22) Actions are the 
initiating events within a war game. Reactions are the 
opposite side's counter to that action. Finally, 
counteractions are the initial side's response to a 
reaction. This sequence is maintained until the completion 
of the simulated critical event, or a determination is made 
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that the current COA is inadequate. The theories selected 
for this study provide a full account for the battle 
events, so the action-reaction-counteraction cycle is 
derived entirely from the respective authors. As each 
Little Big Horn theory is war-gamed, critical comments will 
be provided regarding the scenario on several levels. 
First, the actions ascribed to Custer and the Indians by 
each author will be examined in order to gauge if the 
actions are consistent with any physical evidence 
available. Second, the decisions and actions attributed to 
Custer by each author will be separately examined in order 
to compose three complete strategic pictures of the battle 
through Custer's eyes. In this form, an analysis of 
Custer's actions and decisions compares Custer's actions at 
Little Big Horn with his operational history. This is done 
in order to ascertain the degree of consistency between the 
two. Last, this thesis will compare the critical events 
within each theory to the independent assumptions made 
earlier as a complementary test to the other analyses. The 
result is a ranking, by degree of probability, of the three 
theories. 
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C. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA 
1. Custer's Operational History and Tendencies 
Two aspects of Custer's early military career seemed 
to lay the foundation for his future actions. First, he 
gained a reputation for being fearless in the face of any 
odds. Second, Custer had a penchant for taking innovative 
risks and succeeding at will. After a particularly daring 
raid on a Confederate outpost during the Civil War, General 
George McClellan wrote this of Custer: "Custer was simply a 
reckless, gallant boy, undeterred by fatigue, unconscious 
of fear ... " (Ambrose, p. 173) That gallantry came with a 
price, though. Custer lost more men during the Civil War 
than almost any other commander at his level. (Connell, p. 
116; Ambrose p. 196) Ambrose's charge that Custer would 
charge the enemy anywhere, regardless of relative strength 
seems to sum up this characteristic. (p. 195) 
Custer incorporated his personal daring into an 
impressive array of enterprising military maneuvers. 
During the Civil War, he led numerous daring cavalry 
charges. One such charge, against Confederate General Jeb 
Stuart's troops, netted Custer several hundred captured 
troops, various enemy artillery pieces, and a spot 
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promotion to Major General (Ambrose, p. 2 03) . His 
proclivity for audaciously successful operations, 
casualties notwithstanding, resulted in the adoption of the 
term "Custer's Luck" as a Union aphorism. Later, during 
several encounters with Indians, 
military audacity to new limits. 
he would push this 
Custer was initially frustrated by his first few 
attempts to engage Indian warriors. He found them to be a 
wily foe, more concerned with distracting the soldiers long 
enough for their women and children to escape, and then 
evading capture themselves. Custer's first anticipated 
great battle with Indians was ·to have taken place in Kansas 
in 1873. A tribe of Cheyenne was posturing for a big fight 
(Ambrose, p. 266). But in true Indian fashion, the bravado 
displayed was a smokescreen for a stealthy withdrawal. The 
toughest part of fighting Indians, according to Custer, was 
finding them (Ambrose, p. 284). Once found, though, Custer 
was convinced that Indians could never stand up to the 
firepower of cavalry. 
Custer's ultimate modus operandi regarding combat with 
the Indians seemed to be established during his first 
significant fight with them, the Battle of the Washita. 
Much like the Little Big Horn excursion, in 1868 Custer was 
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on the trail of a large group of Indians. His objective 
was to force them back onto their reservation. Driving his 
men doggedly, Custer tracked the Indian group through harsh 
winter conditions, just south of the Kansas Territory. 
Upon discovering a Cheyenne village of unknown proportions 
in the Washita River valley, Custer crafted an ad hoc 
attack plan that was dreadfully prophetic of things to 
come. First, he insisted on preparing that night for a 
dawn attack, even though his men were exhausted and hungry. 
Second, he performed no reconnaissance on the village, for 
fear it would provoke an exodus by the Indians before his 
men were in position. Third, he divided his 800-man 
regiment into four separate assault units, and spread them 
around the perimeter of the village. Custer was about to 
launch a four-pronged attack on a target of unknown 
strength, with a regiment of men who were driven to the 
limits of physical exhaustion. It was pure madness; it was 
pure Custer. (Ambrose, pp. 317-322) 
The surprise and shock of the maneuver paid off. The 
Indians were stunned, and many of them were gunned down 
while running out of their tipis. Some escaped to a far 
riverbank to return some harassing fire, but they were 
quickly suppressed. Custer's troops also gunned down many 
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women and children. More than 100 Indians were killed, and 
a herd of 900 ponies and the village were captured. The 
strength of the Indian camp probably did not exceed 300 
warriors, but it was a satisfying victory for Custer. The 
troopers burned everything they could and shot all of the 
ponies before withdrawing. This battle reinforced what had 
become a simple truism for Custer. Victory was assured 
against the Indians, if only you could find them. (Welch, 
pp. 62-64) 
Several disturbing elements of the battle went 
unnoticed, obscured by the collective joy at the first 
tangible victory against the Indians in this region. 
Custer's disregard for a reconnaissance and the physical 
condition of his men could have cost him dearly had he met 
a larger or more prepared Indian force. Indeed, "Custer's 
Luck" had been operating in full force, as thousands more 
warriors were camped just miles downstream from the village 
Custer attacked. Indians from the downstream encampments 
began gathering on the high bluffs surrounding Custer's 
troops. Concerned with the growing number of hostiles, 
Custer again displayed remarkable gumption. He gathered 
his troops and set out down the river, in the direction of 
the remaining Indian villages. Custer ventured, correctly, 
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that the Indians on the bluffs would become alarmed and 
return to their villages to protect them. As night fell, 
Custer reversed the direction of his march and withdrew 
from the river valley, his victory intact. This triumph 
against the Cheyenne only reinforced the feeling of 
invincibility that Custer felt when fighting Indians. 
2. Independent Hypotheses 
In order to provide more clarity regarding the events 
on and around Custer Hill, this study proposes several 
hypotheses derived from an analysis of battlefield grave 
markers and other evidence. It is important to note that 
these hypotheses were arrived at independent of the 
explanatory theories of Ambrose, Fox, and Gray. While 
information contained in all . three authors' works was 
utilized in the formation of these hypotheses, they 
represent detached analysis. Figure 2-4 is a depiction of 
the grave markers on the Custer Battlefield. There are 252 
grave markers indicated in this figure, even though roughly 
210 men fell at Custer Battlefield. Fox explains that in 
some instances, a single burial plot was mistaken for two. 
In any case, the general pattern of the grave markers is 
still useful for establishing a gross pattern of movement 
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Figure 2-4. Grave Markers on Custer Battlefield 
The battlefield grave markers represent the best 
possible estimation of where virtually every member of 
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Custer's force fell. Despite aspersions cast on the 
placement and exact number of grave markers, archaeologist 
Richard Allan Fox, Jr. contends that gross patterns derived 
from the locations of the grave markers are legitimately 
representative of where most of the soldiers fell (pp. 73-
77) . Working off the hypothesis that the grave markers 
represent the general configuration of Custer's force 
throughout the battle, and other physical evidence, this 
thesis advances the following assumptions. 
a. Escape Was Impossible 
The number of grave markers versus the number of 
troopers assigned to Custer's force provides a full account 
of personnel. That is to say, there are no credible claims 
that any significant number of Army personnel escaped 
beyond the boundaries of the battlefield area. A few 
bodies found in the Indian camp area appear to have been 
taken there by the Indians (Graham, 1926, p. 140). The 
apparent containment of the troopers' deaths to the 
battlefield area suggests that either there was no attempt 
to escape the Indian onslaught or that escape was 
effectively impossible. Given the skirmish line 
disposition of grave markers on the left and right flanks 
of the battlefield, as well as the massed concentration of 
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the grave markers around Custer Hill itself, it is 
concluded that any attempt to flee the area by soldiers was 
not possible (Figure 2-4). While Custer certainly had a 
predilection for charging superior numbers in battle, there 
is nothing to suggest that he was suicidal. Therefore, it 
should be expected that Custer, or any one of his officers, 
would have initiated an orderly retreat in the face of an 
assured rout. Surely, any possible humiliation incurred 
from a retreat would be preferable to the annihilation of 
his command. At the very least, Custer could have been 
expected to seek a link to Benteen and the rest of his 
regiment, save Reno. Because of the reasons listed above, 
the author is persuaded to offer the hypothesis that 
Custer's command was overwhelmed in place because by the 
time they recognized the situation for what it was, an 
inevitable slaughter, they were surrounded. Exactly how 
and at what point they were surrounded will be discussed 
after the war-gaming process is complete. 
b. The "Last Standn, for All Intents and 
Purposes 
The general layout of the grave markers is a 
clear indication that Custer's forces were overwhelmed from 
the south and east first (Figure 2-4). In what was 
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essentially the conclusion of the battle, the clustered 
remaining troops fought to their death, in place, at the 
infamous Custer Hill location. That location was the 
approximate place where Custer and his men realized they 
were surrounded. There are several authors who advance the 
notion that the fighting at Custer Hill was not the end of 
the battle (Fox, p. 220; Gray, p. 394; Welch p. 171). They 
postulate that groups of men were either sent out in a 
skirmish line to the south, or simply fled the carnage at 
Custer Hill. Some of the grave markers to the immediate 
south and west of Custer Hill are thought to represent 
survivors from Custer Hill. This is an insignificant 
detail to either of these independent hypotheses. The men 
who supposedly fled Custer Hill did not get very far, so 
the initial hypothesis remains unaffected. Additionally, 
the number and layout of the grave markers at Custer Hill 
itself is unquestionably representative of a surrounded 
group. No skirmish lines are evident in this location, as 
the grave markers represent a group of 54 men in a 
haphazardly clustered arrangement. Judging from the 
disposition of the grave markers in every location except 
Custer Hill, the outlying gravesites most closely resemble 
skirmish lines, with varying degrees of organization. This 
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suggests that in every location except Custer Hill, there 
were deployments that would correspond to typical offensive 
or defensive maneuvers. Custer Hill stands alone as a 
frantically disorganized constellation. 
The fact that the pressure on the battlefield 
first came from the south and east, and Custer's retreat 
routes were north, is easily established by three factors. 
First, nearly all of the primary Indian accounts support 
the perception that the initial Indian attacks were mounted 
from the south (Fox, pp. 143-145; Gray, pp. 366-367; Brady 
pp. 253-254). It is difficult to discern a definitive 
directional source for the Indian attacks due to their 
swarming, infiltrating nature. However, it is generally 
accepted that, initially, the Indians were crossing the 
river at several points and slowly enveloping the troopers 
from the south. While the troopers were most likely being 
slowly surrounded from the east and west as well, the 
dominant threat came from the south. Second, it is logical 
to presume that the Custer Ridge and Calhoun Hill 
locations, where grave markers indicate company cohesion 
(Fox, pp .. 156-161) , can be considered the earlier stages of 
the battle. The comprehensible defensive formations and 
unit solidarity suggested by identifying grave markers 
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signify methodical maneuvers that were absent at Custer 
Hill. Fox suggests that the lines of troopers at Calhoun 
Hill and the Keogh sector should be interpreted as a 
tactical disintegration. He considers the dispersed nature 
of the lines, marked by small bunches of troopers, as a 
sign of a fleeing force. Again, this is irrelevant to my 
hypothesis, because all indications are that the direction 
of movement for these soldiers was toward Custer Hill. 
Conversely, The j urnbled mix of over 50 troopers from five 
different companies on Custer Hill has to indicate a 
desperate bunching. It would be illogical to imagine that 
out of the chaos of Custer Hill, several companies 
deploying over distances in excess of half a mile in 
cohesive company groupings. 
Finally, given that the initial Indian attack had 
advanced primarily from the south and slowly encroached the 
east and west flanks, why then are the bodies on Custer 
Hill clustered midway down the western slope of the hill? 
One would assume that in the face of a massive attack from 
the south, at least some of the soldiers would have made 
their way toward the top of Custer Hill, even cresting it 
to the northern slope in an effort to escape. The answer 
is clear. The group on Custer Hill, preoccupied with 
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engaging enemy from the south and possibly west, was 
surprised and overwhelmed from the northeast and 
effectively corralled. As a corollary to this hypothesis, 
it is logical to assume that while the pressure that 
resulted from the Indian attacks from the south were 
substantial; it was the Indian force that crested Custer 
Hill that provided a swift coup-de-main. Again, the 
reference for this assertion is the group of soldiers who 
apparently left Custer Hill and fled south. Whether these 
soldiers were dispatched in a planned defensive maneuver, 
or fled in terror is not pertinent. 
they were able to advance to 
ostensibly following 






of least frantically, 
resistance. Coupled with the fact that no significant 
movement up Custer Hill, beyond the clustered grave 
markers, can be discerned, the author is persuaded to offer 
that an overwhelming force surprised Custer from the 
northeast, while he was engaging a substantial threat from 
the south, and effectively ended the fighting at that 
point. Any survivors who left Custer Hill were merely 
delaying the inevitable, as there was no way out at this 
point. 
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c. The Deliberate Positioning of Custer's 
Forces 
The final hypothesis regarding the Battle of 
Little Big Horn pertains to the disposition of Custer's 
force prior to any significant fighting. First, an 
examination of the battlefield map, with grave markers 
indicated, reveals a highly attenuated and segmented force 
(Figure 2-4) . From the group of markers at Custer Hill to 
the skirmish lines at Calhoun Hill and Calhoun Ridge, there 
is a distance of over 1000 meters. From Custer Hill to the 
center of the next largest concentration of grave markers, 
the Keogh sector on Custer Ridge is a distance of 600 
meters. Even from the northern edge of Keogh's skirmish 
line to Custer Hill is over 300 meters. The distances 
between groups, considering the weaponry of the day and the 
troopers lack of combat training, are hardly indicative of 
a robust defensive posture deployed from a central 
location. 
A further examination of some of the outlying 
defensive positions is also useful. The line of grave 
markers indicating Keogh's I company position is in a very 
interesting place. The I company line is on the eastern 
side of Custer Ridge, and any view of the river and the 
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bulk of infiltrating Indians would have been impeded. Two 
explanations are offered for the curious location of 
Keogh's I company. Fox (p. 166) contends that Keogh held I 
company in reserve, as a backup for the companies engaged 
on Calhoun Hill. Gray (p. 392) argues that Keogh's company 
was deployed in a rearguard action, to facilitate a 
complete retreat toward Custer Hill. An interpretation of 
the Keogh sector grave markers deduces that the directional 
orientation of the line is such that two explanations 
remain possible. One possibility is that the troopers 
along Custer Ridge were deliberately placed there either in 
reserve or as a defensive skirmish line facing east. The 
other possibility .is that the line of grave markers 
represents a panicked flight toward Custer Hill, with 
troopers being overtaken and killed from the rear. Two 
inferential assumptions facilitate the preference of one of 
these scenarios. 
First, the degree of separation between the 
groups on Custer Hill and Calhoun Hill tends to support a 
purposeful spreading of forces across the battlefield. If 
it is to be accepted that Custer's force was retreating en 
mass across the battlefield, one must also accept that he 
left his rearguard to die, and offered no substantial 
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support while he was fleeing. This supposition seems 
improbable, as it goes against everything we know about 
Custer's fighting style. If the Indian force was 
overwhelming at the outset, why would Custer retreat toward 
a distant topographic feature while stringing his forces 
out hopelessly? A more plausible explanation is that 
Custer's force was initially spread about the battlefield 
under light, if any pressure, in some type of paused 
posture. They were either waiting for reinforcements from 
Benteen or simply surveying the village in an attempt to 
craft an effective strategy of attack. Second, the 
orientation of the grave markers also best supports a 
purposeful spread of the forces with the Calhoun and Keogh 
sector elements providing alternately oriented static 
security positions. If indeed the Custer battlefield 
indicates a total retreat from Calhoun Hill to Custer Hill, 
with Keogh's troopers as a· rearguard to support the Calhoun 
troopers, why then is there no semblance of a skirmish line 
facing south in the Keogh sector? In all likelihood, the 
retreating soldiers from Calhoun Hill passed through 
Keogh's defensive position, which was facing east. 
Specifically, this thesis proposes that the troopers in the 
Calhoun sector were primarily charged with keeping watch 
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and repelling the infiltrating Indians from the south, 
while Keogh's contingent was positioned to provide a 
rearguard toward the east. While these two elements held 
their position, the rest of the Custer contingent was 
moving northwest, either tracking the Indian village or 
setting up another defensive position. Calhoun's position 
was overrun, and the survivors began to flee, chased by 
scores of Indians along Custer Ridge. Keogh's line, 
oriented to the east to ostensibly observe for infiltrating 
Indians and/or Benteen's group, joined in the flight toward 
Custer Hill. Concurrently, Custer and his group recognized 
the impending danger and sought suitable terrain to prepare 
a defense. Their position on the western side of Custer 
Hill suggests they were to the west of that position before 
retreating up the hill. It seems doubtful that a large 
force approaching Custer Hill from pressure in any other 
direction would choose the western side as a place to make 
a "stand". It also seems quite likely that the group with 
Custer encountered some resistance from the west, 
underpinning the orientation of the grave markers on the 
west side of Custer Hill. In short, Custer's force was 
purposefully spread out, and converged on Custer Hill from 
two different directions. 
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d. Putting the Assumptions Together 
The amalgamation of these three assumptions falls 
dreadfully short of a coherent theory of the Battle Of 
Little Big Horn. They are, however, useful as a yardstick 
by which to measure the plausibility of existing theories. 
In doing so, it is necessary to communicate the three 
assumptions in a concise, cogent manner. Custer's fateful 
odyssey began with a deliberate division of his forces 
across the battlefield site. Part of his command was to 
hold an Indian infiltration, initially interpreted as 
inconsequential, at bay and wait for Benteen. The rest of 
the command continued to scout further north. The troopers 
at Calhoun Hill and in the Keogh sector were overrun from 
the south, and fled toward Custer Hill. At the same time, 
Custer's northern group recognized the increased danger and 
moved onto the west side of Custer Hill to affect a 
defense. Shortly after reaching Custer Hill, the command 
was surrounded, overwhelmed from the north, and 
slaughtered. These operating assumptions will help to 
guide the following war-gaming effort and critique of the 
three chosen Little Big Horn theories. 
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IV. WAR-GAMING THE THEORIES 
The analysis of each theory will begin with a 
Synchronization Matrix. Condensing the critical points and 
major decisions that distinguish each theory from the 
others will provide a reference for the discussions 
following the matrices. Viewing the battle as a mixture of 
command decisions and multiple, simultaneous events 
provides a much different perspective than a running 
narrative alone. This method facilitates an enhanced 
analysis of decisions on a background of rapidly changing 
circumstances. Following the Synchronization Matrix for 
each theory will be a sequential evaluation of that theory 
in relation to the historical record, Custer's operational 
history and propensities, and the independent hypotheses. 
A. SREPHEN AMBROSE 
Ambrose's account of the Battle of Little Big Horn is 
written in the descriptive prose of a talented writer. 
Rather than belabor the reader with minutia regarding 
precise battle progressions, he chronicles the events of 
the battle in an illustrative narrative. As such, it is 
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necessary to infer many of the time periods for the battle 
sequence. The Synchronization Matrix depicting Ambrose 
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Table 4-1. Synchronization Matrix - Ambrose 
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Elapsed Time +1:45 + 2:00 
Custer's 
Commands/Decisions 




Southern Indian Sweeping Annihilation 







Crazy Horse Attack Annihilation 
Contingent Custer's complete 
group on 
Custer Hill 
Table 4-1 continued. Synchronization Matrix - Ambrose 
1. Reconciling Ambrose's Theory with History 
Stephen Ambrose wrote Crazy Horse and Custer after a 
four-year research hiatus devoted to gathering and 
analyzing records, interviews, and surveying battlefields. 
Ambrose declares that his primary guides in the re-
enactment of the Battle of Little Big Horn are Colonel W. 
A. Graham, who wrote The Custer Myth, and Edgar Stewart, 
who wrote Custer's Luck (Ambrose, p. 436). As such, 
Ambrose's theory regarding the battle can be said to typify 
the traditional view, described by Fox as the fatalistic 
theme. The connotation of this description is derived from 
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the notion that Custer engaged the Indians immediately upon 
entering the Custer Battlefield area, and was immediately 
on the defensive until the rout was complete. In this 
vein, the fatalistic component is that Custer's destiny was 
sealed from the outset. Due to the voluminous and often 
contradictory nature of the primary Indian accounts 
regarding the battle, it can be understood that each of the 
authors has incorporated specific accounts that tend to 
support their own arguments. Further confounding the 
utility of primary Indian accounts is their narrow, 
personal nature. Many of the accounts detail only 
individual encounters and are difficult to amalgamate into 
a coherent strategic narrative. Given this, it is a folly 
to deconstruct the use of these accounts or attempt to 
compile accounts to counter each theory. Suffice to say 
that all of the authors' theories use first-hand 
descriptions of the battle for support, and all of the 
theories fall within the realm of possibility vis-a-vis 
these accounts. While Ambrose's theory may lack some of 
the detail and detached analytical quality of the other two 
theories, it is important to include it because of its 
widely accepted credibility. It does, in fact, represent 
the conventional view of the Battle of Little Big Horn. 
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a. The Clash at Medicine Tail Coulee 
Ambrose suggests that Custer's entire battalion 
rode down Medicine Tail Coulee, where some 1500 Indian 
warriors met them. The battalion was repelled from their 
objective, an attack on the Indian village, and immediately 
went on a defensive retreat up toward higher ground (Figure 














!J !J Gail's 1500 W3rriars 
D D 
Figure 4-1. Custer's Retreat from Medicine Tail Coulee 
After examining the general layout of the area 
under consideration, several aspects of Ambrose's 
contentions bear examination. First, if it is assumed that 
Custer recognized the looming threat of Gall's blocking 
force as he descended Medicine Tail Coulee, the choice to 
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turn and retreat north, further away from any supporting 
units appears questionable. However, the terrain in that 
area may have very well contributed to that decision. The 
bluffs to the south precluded any movement in that 
direction. A retreat back up Medicine Tail Coulee would 
severely inhibit the proper employment of defensive 
skirmish lines due to the channelized topography. Given 
the circumstance as Ambrose presents them, it seems 
possible that Custer may have indeed initiated a retreat 
toward Calhoun Hill, over more amenable terrain. 
A second aspect of this scenario appears a little 
more dubious. The route of Custer's retreat from the 
opening of Medicine Tail Coulee to Calhoun Hill covers some 
1500 meters. To visualize Custer's battalion of over 200 
soldiers meeting a force of 1500 Indian warriors, and 
retreating for close to a mile without taking any 
casualties is difficult to accept. Granted, it may be 
possible that Custer recognized the threat early enough to 
turn toward higher ground before the groups were at within 
weapons range, but that chance seems slim. A group of 1500 
warriors, some on horseback, would be spread over a 
considerable area. Their fresh ponies would have been able 
to close on the weary horses of the 7th Cavalry with little 
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difficulty. Any route Custer could have taken to Calhoun 
Hill would certainly have presented a great chance of 
skirmishing before the battalion reached Calhoun Hill. On 
balance, while it seems possible for the events at Little 
Big Horn to have unfolded as Ambrose suggests, that 
possibility is somewhat remote. 
Finally, Ambrose's description of the action at 
Medicine Tail Coulee fails to account for the numerous 
government shell casings found to the east of Medicine Tail 
Coulee, along Nye-Cartwright Ridge (Fox, p. 139; Gray pp. 
362-363; see Figure 4-1). The surveys that located the 
artifacts in this particular area were done well before 
Ambrose wrote Crazy Horse and Custer, so his exclusion of 
this data is worthy of note. This portion of Ambrose's 
hypothesis seems contentious. 
b. The Retreat Across Custer Battlefield 
As Custer's battalion entered the bounds of the 
battlefield proper, the first evidence of a deployed 
skirmish line is reflected in the grave markers on Calhoun 
Hill. The analysis of this portion of Ambrose's theory 
will refer to Figure 4-2, as it represents the gross 
pattern of where people fell during the battle. 
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Custer's battalion, according to Ambrose, was 
already on the defensive as they crested Calhoun Hill and 
began making their way toward Custer Hill. With Custer at 
the head of the column, Lt. Calhoun's company was deployed 
along Calhoun Hill/Ridge to check the advance of the 
tracking Indian force. The rest of the battalion was 
strung out in between Custer Hill and Calhoun Hill. 
Ambrose contends that as Custer reached Custer Hill, Crazy 
Horse crested Custer Hill from the northeast and the 
battalion was overwhelmed from both ends. Like the episode 
at Medicine Tail Coulee, there are several aspects of this 
situation that bear examination. 
The first feature of this scenario that taxes the 
explanation given is the size of the battlefield. The 
grave markers indicate a force that was exceedingly spread 
out. If the battalion was in a retreat, one would expect 
the deployed lines to be within supporting distance of one 
another. At first glance, it appears that Calhoun's 
company on Calhoun Hill was left with no support from the 
other companies. However, according to the prescribed 
cavalry tactics of the time, a company may be deployed with 
additional reserve elements positioned 300 meters to the 
rear (Fox, p. 44). The layout of grave markers does not 
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discount the possibility that some portion of them located 
on the southern half of Custer Ridge may have been a 
strategic reserve for Calhoun's company. However, two 
observations regarding the location of these grave markers 
seem problematic. First, if Custer's battalion had been 
operating as a single unit, which Ambrose seems to 
intimate, then the retreat must have broken the battalion 
into two maneuver elements. Since Custer was obviously at 
the head of the battalion, it makes tactical sense that the 
next senior officer would be commanding the rearguard 
element. That officer would have been Capt. Keogh. Also 
supporting this assumption is the fact that Capt. Keogh is 
the closest officer to Calhoun Hill who held the rank of 
Captain. The two officers slain on Calhoun Hill were both 
junior lieutenants. Capt. Keogh's body was found some 450 
meters to the north of the closest flank on Calhoun Hill, 
hardly in a good position to observe the fighting and 
direct a supporting reserve element. To accept Ambrose' s 
scenario is to accept the fact that Capt. Keogh did not 
reinforce the positions on Calhoun Hill, and may have fled 
the scene altogether. This goes against Keogh's character, 
as we know it. Keogh had a colorful military history as a 
mercenary in Africa, a member of the papal army, and as a 
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decorated officer in the Civil War, as well as being one of 
Custer's most trusted soldiers (Connell, pp. 290-293). As 
a seasoned combat veteran of multiple wars, it is unlikely 
that he failed his duties as miserably as Ambrose's account 
suggests. 
The second feature that raises questions is the 
entire string of markers along Custer Ridge. If indeed 
Custer had deployed sequential defensive lines to 
facilitate the retreat, we must accept that only Calhoun's 
lines held in place. The directional orientation of the 
grave markers along Custer Ridge offer no hint of coherent 
defensive lines oriented toward the south. The possibility 
exists that after Calhoun's troopers were killed in place, 
all defensive positions to the north of them panicked and 
began streaming. toward Custer Hill. The sheer number of 
Indian warriors in such close proximity could indeed have 
caused such a panic, but the fact that only one company's 
worth of men stood firm is somewhat suspect. 
Finally, the number of Indian casualties, 
estimated by Ambrose to be 40, hardly seems indicative of a 
massed clash between two well-armed groups. Custer's 
battalion, armed with accurate Springfield carbines, should 
have been able to inflict more casualties on such a 
87 
concentrated group of adversaries. The 1500 Indians 
charging from the south would have presented ample targets 
for the troopers. The superior organization and discipline 
of the Custer's battalion should have allowed them to hold 
off the Indians, at least temporarily, and inflict more 
casualties. This, of course, assumes that Custer's troops 
were following orders and operating efficiently. Ambrose's 
theory, when combined with the grave markers, tells the 
story of a panicked rout. Efficiency and discipline went 
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Figure 4-2. Custer Battlefield Grave Markers 
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c. The Last Stand at Custer Hill 
Ambrose's account of the last fighting at Custer 
Hill dovetails nicely with the preceding events offered. 
With Custer at the head, nearly half of the battalion was 
ascending Custer Hill. The retreat was halted by a torrent 
of warriors pouring over the crest of Custer Hill, from the 
northeast. Ostensibly, the throng of 1500 Indians who had 
enveloped Calhoun Hill was now making its way along Custer 
Ridge. The clustered mass of grave markers on Custer Hill, 
and the smattering of grave markers trailing to the 
southwest of this position correspond well with Ambrose's 
theory. As Custer led his men up Custer Hill, they could 
have bunched up when the Indians rode over them from their 
concealed position. Any troopers not gunned down in this 
crowd would have had to flee southwest, as all other 
avenues of escape were shut off (Figure 4-3). 
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Figure 4-3. The Final Moments on Custer Battlefield 
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2. Ambrose's Battle through Custer's Eyes 
The decision that Custer made, to split the regiment 
into three battalions as the 7th Cavalry approached the 
Little Big Horn Valley, is consistent throughout all three 
theories. Given that these portions of the accounts are 
consistent, the only comment offered in regard to them 
pertains to Custer's mindset. By splitting his regiment in 
such close proximity to the enemy, Custer displayed a 
preference to find and engage the enemy over any concerns 
about their strength. The maneuver is also consistent with 
his actions at the Battle of Washita, where he split his 
force into four elemen~s for a hastily coordinated attack. 
Ambrose asserts that Custer and his battalion met a 
force of 1500 Indians as he descended Medicine Tail Coulee. 
Since Custer had already sent Reno ahead to engage the 
Indian village from the south, it would seem prudent for 
him to follow up on his promise to support that attack. 
There is, however, a precedent for Custer withdrawing in 
the face of a superior force. During the Battle of 
Washita, Custer abandoned the Cheyenne village he had just 
overrun due to a growing number of warriors from downstream 
villages gathering on the overlooking cliffs (Ambrose, p. 
321) . Then again, the main objective of the Washita 
92 
operation had been achieved, so Custer enacted the retreat 
with the knowledge that his reputation would remain intact. 
All things considered, it appears odd for Custer to have 
immediately initiated a retreat without mounting a major 
attack first. The fact that Custer's battalion took no 
casualties until they reached Calhoun Hill suggests that 
the retreat call came early without much hesitation. 
After the retreat command, given that Custer's 
battalion was fiercely pursued the enemy, it seems unlikely 
that a distant objective like Custer Hill would serve as a 
defensive rally point. Admittedly, it is the highest 
ground in the area, but at what price would occupying it be 
deemed acceptable? As the battalion crested Calhoun Hill, 
it would seem prudent to enact a strong defense as soon as 
possible, but Ambrose submits that Custer, at the head of 
the battalion, pushed on toward Custer Hill. With 
Calhoun's company deployed as rearguard over 1000 meters to 
the south against 1500 pursuing warriors, Custer and a good 
half of the battalion were in no position whatsoever to 
provide supporting fire for a complete retreat. It seems 
valid to offer that 200+ troopers in a decent tactical 
position stand a better chance of fending off 1500 warriors 
than the single company speed bump suggested by Ambrose. 
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In Ambrose's defense, however, it is likely that Custer was 
considering the task of defending a position for an 
indefinite amount of time. Pondering that point, making 
way toward the most suitable terrain in the area may very 
well have taken precedent. Also mitigating this criticism 
is the possibility that fully half of the battalion may 
have been allotted for the rearguard. The grave markers 
along Custer Ridge represent the collapse of the rearguard 
and their subsequent flight toward Custer Hill. 
Regardless, it appears that Ambrose contends that Custer 
left only 100 or so troopers at the southern end of the 
battlefield to intercept a mob of 1500 Indians. Custer and 
the other half of the battalion would have been in no 
position to support them, despite the strategic 
attractiveness of Custer Hill. While on the balance it 
seems possible for Custer to have made the decisions 
attributed to him by Ambrose, several of those decisions 
would have gone against the temperament that contributed to 
the legend of Custer's Luck. 
3. Reconciling Ambrose's Theory with the Independent 
Hypotheses 
Chapter II advances three independent hypotheses 
concerning the Battle of Little Big Horn. Concisely 
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stated, these hypotheses provide a second level of critical 
analysis to apply to Ambrose's theory. First, escape was 
improbable, if not impossible. Second, Custer Hill was the 
point in time and space where the force ran out of options, 
their destruction assured. Third, the distribution of 
Custer's forces over such a great area was purposeful. 
Examining Ambrose's theory with regard to these hypotheses 
will assist in evaluating its relative credibility. 
a. Escape Impossible 
Ambrose's theory contends that Custer and his 
battalion were on the defensive immediately upon descending 
Medicine Tail Coulee. They were pushed or drawn toward the 
most suitable ground on which to make a stand. Pursued by 
1500 Indian warriors to the south, the leading element of 
the battalion ran into another 1000 warriors at Custer 
Hill. Some survivors evaded the slaughter on Custer Hill, 
but only briefly. The refugees fled southwest and were 
wiped out before they made it very far. In sum, the moment 
Custer decided to enact a retreat toward Calhoun Hill, 
there was no chance for his battalion. Ambrose's theory 
squares precisely with the first independent hypothesis. 
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b. Custer Hill was the Fundamental End 
Again, Ambrose's theory is in line with the 
independent hypothesis offered here. While it can be said 
that Ambrose's account relegates Custer's battalion to its 
fate relatively early in the battle, the premise that they 
did not realize they were surrounded until reaching Custer 
Hill still stands. The group of troopers ascending Custer 
Hill and fixated on the threat to the south bunched 
together as an unexpected attack was initiated from their 
rear. The fact that some of the troopers fled Custer Hill 
to the southwest is incidental. Their flight does not 
change the fact that the battle was effectively over at 
this point. 
c. Spread Out by Design? 
Ambrose's positioning of Custer's battalion, 
while the product of decisions made by Custer, is tough to 
classify as a deliberate spread across the battlefield. 
Specifically, the distance between the group on Custer Hill 
and the group on Calhoun Hill precludes any notion that 
they could have been actively supporting one another. 
Ambrose's explanation of a ragged retreat indicates that no 
particularly robust stand was made toward the southern 
group of Indians, except for Calhoun's single company. As 
96 
stated before, Custer may have been envisioning a defensive 
stand for an indefinite period. This would explain his 
fixation on attaining the best defensive position 
available. He did this, however, at the cost of a 
crumbling rearguard. All in all, the probability that 
Custer positioned his forces across the battlefield 
intentionally, within Ambrose's scenario, is relatively 
low. 
B. RICHARD ALLAN FOX, JR. 
Fox has advanced a number of unique propositions 
pertaining to the intent and disposition of Custer's troops 
prior to the actual battle. These fresh ideas combine to 
form an interesting study that challenges the conventional 
school of thought on the topic of Little Big Horn. The 
timetable offered for Fox's theory is deduced from his 
account. The Synchronization Matrix depicting Fox's theory 
is Table 4-2. 
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Elapsed Time 0 hr +: 15 +1:00 +1:15 +1:30 
Custer's Dispatch Turn Send Left Consolidate 
Commands/Decisions Reno remaining Wing to on Calhoun 
toward troops probe Ford Hill 
Indian North B 
camp 
Reno's Actions Ride Ford Approaching Begin 
toward river skirmish Retreat 
Indian line 
camp 
Right Wing Actions North North Consolidate 
with toward on Calhoun 
Custer Calhoun Hill 
Hill 
Left Wing Actions North Probe Ford Light Consolidate 
with B skirmishing on Calhoun 
Custer across Hill 
river 
Southern Indian Cross river 




Crazy Horse Engaged 
Contingent with Reno 
Table 4-2. Synchronization Matrix - Fox 
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Elapsed Time +1:45 +2: 00 +2:15 +2:30 
Custer's Hold Calhoun Halt Deploy Retreat 
Commands/Decisions Hill, northern defensive lines toward 
continue probe, below Custer Custer Hill 
probe north return to Hill 
Cemetery 
Ridge 
Reno's Actions Effectively 
out of the 
fight 
Right Wing Actions Hold Calhoun c co. E co. west Retreat 
Hill sent to skirmish line, toward 
suppress F co. east Custer Hill 
attacks 
from west 
Left Wing Actions Probe north Halt Tactical Haphazard 
along river northern disintegration flight 
probe, in the face of along 
backtrack 3-sided attack. Custer 
to Ridge 
Cemetery toward 
Ridge Custer Hill 
Southern Indian Increasing Surround Overwhelm right Pursue left 
Infiltrators pressure on right wing wing and 
right wing wing on move 
south and attention 
west. toward 
Also Custer Hill 
firing at 
left wing 
Crazy Horse Disengage Infil up Overwhelm right Kill 
Contingent from Reno, Deep wing from stragglers 
head toward Coulee northeast along 
Custer between Custer 
wings, Ridge, and 
and over move toward 
Custer Custer Hill 
Ridge 
Table 4-2 continued. Synchronization Matrix - Fox 
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Elapsed Time +2:45 +3:00 
Custer's No options, Obliteration 
Commands/Decisions surrounded complete 
on Custer 
Hill 
Right Wing Actions Desperate Obliteration 
flight by E complete 
co. to 
south 
Left Wing Actions Effectively Obliteration 
annihilated complete 
Southern Indian Pressing Obliteration 
Infiltrators Custer Hill complete 
from south 
and west 
Crazy Horse Overruns Obliteration 
Contingent Custer's complete 
group from 
east 
Table 4-2 continued. Synchronization Matrix - Fox 
1. Reconciling Fox's Theory with History 
Fox wrote the book, both literally and figuratively, 
on modern physical evidence gathered on the Custer 
Battlefield. His theory is derived, in part, from an 
original re-creation of events as told by bullet slugs, 
shell casings, grave markers, and other relics found in an 
archaeological excavation of portions of the battlefield in 
1984-1985. The following discussion evaluates the actions 
attributed to Custer's forces by Fox vis-a-vis the 
historical record. 
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a. Custer's Route and Disposition After Leaving 
Reno 
Fox relates that after Custer sent Reno to charge 
the Indian village, he turned his troops north. Custer led 
the battalion behind high bluffs, paralleling the river. 
This is not a point of contention among Little Big Horn 
scholars, as primary accounts from U.S. Army participants 
all support this assertion. Fox does, however, advance the 
arguable notion that Custer's battalion was split into two 
wings. One wing advanced down Medicine Tail Coulee toward 
the river, while the other wing traversed the high ground 
parallel to the river, known as Nye-Cartwright Ridge. 
Fox's assertion is supported on three levels. 
First, cavalry tactics. used at this time included 
a standard breakdown of forces. Fox reconciles all of his 
proposed force structures for Custer's regiment with Emory 
Upton's Cavalry Tactics, United States Army (1874), which 
served as the manual for cavalry operations at the time. 
Custer's regiment was broken down into three battalions, 
with each battalion wielding between four and six 
companies. Each battalion was further broken down into two 
functional wings, which could operate independently. 
4-3 is borrowed from Fox (1993) . 
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Table 
Company 2nc1'-4 th 3rd_ stn_l st 
Wing Assignment Left Wing Right Wing 
Table 4-3. Standard Cavalry Battalion Assignments 
The number assigned to each company is indicative 
of the relative seniority of each company commander, with 
the most senior company commander designated l 5 t. The 
orientation of the battalion when moving in line formation 
(all abreast) is toward the top of the page. When moving 
in column formation, the battalion would be in a file 
toward the right side of the page. (Fox, p. 43) An 
assignment of Custer's officers and their companies within 
this framework is indicated in Table 4-4. 
Commander Capt. Yates, F co. ( 2 nd) Capt. Custer, c co. ( 3 rct) 
Lt. Smith, E co. (4th) Lt. Calhoun, L co. ( 5 th) 
Capt Keogh, I co. ( 1 st) 
Wing 
Assignment Left Wing Right Wing 
Table 4-4. Custer's Battalion Assignments 
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Thus r standard cavalry tactics employed at the 
time of the battle indicate that it was indeed possible for 
Custer to operate his battalion in this manner. 
The second factor supporting FOX 1 S two-wing 
theory is archaeological. Fox points to artifacts found 
along the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee and the ridge to 
the southeast of it as an indication of separate movement. 
Figure 4-4 indicates the general area under discussion. 
Calhoun Hill 
Medicine Tail Coulee-
Left Wing Route 
Figure 4-4. Dual approach to Calhoun Hill 
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The artifacts found " ... primarily consist of 
expended government cartridge cases and corresponding 
evidence for Indian firing." (Fox, p. 139) These two areas 
of supposed skirmishing are separated by rough, uneven 
terrain, and traversing directly between the two would not 
be feasible for cavalry companies. Two explanations are 
possible at this point. One is Fox's suggestion of a split 
force, with Custer's left wing advancing down Medicine Tail 
Coulee to the river and the right wing maintaining the high 
ground along Nye-Cartwright Ridge. Another possible 
explanation, albeit unlikely, is that Custer's entire force 
traversed both of these areas while exchanging fire with 
the Indians. The second explanation seems impractical, 
because there is no logical explanation for a circular 
route of travel in this particular area. 
The third factor supporting Fox's two-wing theory 
is first-hand Indian accounts. Fox relates separate Indian 
accounts that indicate independent movement of Custer's 
force down Medicine Tail Coulee and the ridges to the east 
of the river. (pp. 139, 142) Furthermore, these Indian 
accounts also identify E company, by virtue of their 
distinctive gray horses, as one of the units that 
approached the river. (pp. 139-140) Fox's theory regarding 
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dual wing operations, and more specifically his 
apportionment of 
the 
company assignments, seem solidly 
supported by historical record. While other 
possibilities exist, it seems Fox has advanced the most 
likely case. 
b. Right Wing Holds Calhoun Hill While Le:ft 
Wing Probes Northwest 
Perhaps the most unique facet of Fox's theory is 
his claim that Custer's battalion was in an offensive 
posture throughout much of the battle. Part of this 
argument states that the left wing of Custer's battalion 
moved north, after leaving the right wing in the vicinity 
of Calhoun Hill, to search for a suitable place to ford the 
river. Presumably, Custer was less concerned with what he 
considered a negligible threat from the Indians, and more 
interested in ensuring the capture of the fleeing village. 
Half of Fox's contention regarding this issue is 
not disputed. The overwhelming evidence in the form of 
grave markers (Figure 4-5) and primary accounts leads all 
of the authors to concede that nearly half of Custer's 
battalion was slain in the area encompassing Calhoun Hill 
and Custer Ridge. The physical evidence also indicates 
that there is a substantial degree of separation between 
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the lines of grave markers in these two sectors and the 
group on Custer Hill. 
Figure 4-5. Custer Battlefield Grave Markers 
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How · such a great distance came about between 
these two groups is where Fox parts company with 
convention. Fox's contention that the left wing continued 
northwest past Custer Hill, and approached the river, 
relies mostly on primary accounts and oral histories. Don 
Rickey, the chief historian at Custer Battlefield, 
presented Fox with Cheyenne oral history that details a 
contingent of Custer's battalion investigating a ford on 
the river, well north of Custer Hill. (pp. 175-176) 
Additionally, separate primary accounts also indicate that 
the left wing " ... rode beyond where the monument stands 
[Custer Hill] down into the [Little Big Horn] valley until 
we could not see them any more." (Fox, p. 177) Finally, Lt. 
Philo Clark, who was investigating the battle in an 
official capacity in 1877, copied a battle map from a Sioux 
participant he interviewed on a reservation. Regretfully, 
a narrative does not accompany the map, but it clearly 
indicates troop movement from the vicinity of Custer Hill 
down to the river. A general depiction of the accounts 
provided by Fox, for Custer's left wing movements past 




Figure 4-6. Left Wing Movements North of the Battlefield 
Finally, in one of the most detailed accounts of 
the entire battle, an Indian named Runs the Enemy recounts 
an episode of skirmishing some 200-300 meters west of 
Custer Hill during the early stages of the battle. Runs 
the Enemy describes an Indian attack that broke through 
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cavalry lines and captured a substantial number of horses 
(Fox, p. 181). After this episode, Runs the Enemy goes on 
to detail his involvement in the rout of the right wing on 
Calhoun Hill. This, Fox argues, establishes the fact that 
left wing operations did indeed progress beyond Custer Hill 
well before the fabled "Last Stand" . The troopers 
encountered by Runs the Enemy were, therefore, not refugees 
from the Custer Hill slaughter, but part of an earlier 
coordinated movement to the northwest of the battlefield. 
Fox's claim of left wing operations beyond the 
traditional bounds of the battlefield seems well supported. 
While the exact routes and intentions of the left wing are 
conjectural, Fox's thesis regarding this northwestern 
excursion makes sense and fits well with the evidence 
provided. Perhaps the most compelling reason to accept 
Fox's claim of offensive maneuvering by Custer is the 
magnitude of separation between the battalion wings. From 
a tactical standpoint, the defensive positioning of units 
that far apart essentially precludes them from 
realistically supporting one another. There seems no 
logical reason for Custer to spread his forces so thinly 
across such a vast area, other than he was initially 
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offensively probing and unconcerned with the threat posed 
by the Indians. 
c. Left Wing Moves to Custer Hill, Met By 
Survivors of Right Wing 
The final facet of Fox's theory that will be 
examined in relation to the historical record is the 
disposition of the troops on Custer Hill. Fox contends 
that pressure from the west drove Custer's left wing up 
Cemetery Ridge to the western slope of Custer Hill. Some 
20 stragglers from the now annihilated right wing soon 
joined them. There were approximately 100 men gathered on 
Custer Hill in the closing stages of the battle. Roughly 
half of these men left Custer Hill and fled to the west, 
toward the river and the Indian camp. For Fox, this 
represents the practical end of fighting in the battle. 
While almost half of the men fled Custer Hill before the 
"Last Stand", the manner and direction of their flight 
indicate the futility of that action. 
There are two foundations that underlie Fox's 
explanation concerning the arrangement of grave markers on 
Custer Hill (Figure 4-2) . First, the fact that the grave 
markers are clustered on the western slope of Custer Hill 
suggests that the group was maneuvering from the west 
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toward the most advantageous defensive position, relative 
to a threat from the west. It would make no tactical sense 
to ensconce a large force in that particular location for a 
threat from any other direction. The western slope of 
Custer Hill would have afforded the troopers there the high 
ground and a clear view of Indians approaching from the 
west. Second, the opportunity for escape was gone. The 
fighting at this point was desperate, and the troopers 
huddled in a confused mass with no escape route. There 
seems incontrovertible evidence that 
completely surrounded at this time. 
the command was 
The fact that no 
bodies were found attempting to crest Custer Hill to the 
north or east clearly suggests that this path was blocked. 
The grave markers also indicate that the preponderance of 
force in the final attack came from the north and the east. 
Whether the grave markers to the south and west of Custer 
Hill represent a frantic flight or a defensive deployment, 
the fact remains that some forward movement was possible to 
the west and south. Contrarily, the huddled mass at Custer 
Hill proper show that flight in any other direction was 
impossible. 
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2. Fox's Battle Through Custer's Eyes 
Viewed within Fox's theory of the Battle of Little Big 
Horn, General Custer is an aggressive, daring commander who 
seems to take the enemy for granted. While these may seem 
like scathing charges made in hindsight, when compared with 
prior operations Custer took part in, his actions at Little 
Big Horn seem consistent with his experience and character. 
As mentioned in the analysis of Ambrose's theory, the 
events up to and including Custer's division of the 
regiment into three battalions are analogous to his 
previous encounter with the Cheyenne at the Battle of 
Washita. The actions attributed to Custer at Medicine Tail 
Coulee and beyond, particularly the division of the 
battalion into wings, also seem quite feasible. 
Furthermore, the offensive actions undertaken by the left 
wing, to ensure the capture of the entire village, are in 
keeping with Custer's primary concern - escaping Indians. 
With Reno supposedly engaging the enemy from the south, 
Custer saw no reason for an extensive defensive posture. 
The audacity with which Custer parceled his forces out in 
dwindling numbe.rs, in the face of such overwhelming 
numbers, may seem illogical and unconscionable to the basic 
student of military principles. While Custer may have been 
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familiar with those principles, he consistently displayed 
an inclination to dismiss them. On the contrary, the 
scornful regard he held for Indian fortitude, cultivated in 
earlier encounters, encouraged him to stretch his command 
with nary a worry. The picture of Custer, painted by Fox, 
is absolutely consistent with his fabled, impudent past. 
3. Reconciling Fox's Theory with the Independent 
Hypotheses 
A quick review of the three independent hypotheses 
advance in Chapter II will assist in the comprehension of 
this section. First, escape was doubtful. Second, Custer 
Hill was effectively the place and time where General 
Custer ran out of options. Third, the positioning of 
Custer's forces across the battlefield was purposeful. 
Examining Fox's theory with regard to these hypotheses will 
assist in evaluating its relative credibility. 
a. Escape Impossible 
Fox confers substantial freedom of movement to 
Custer's left wing throughout the initial stages of the 
battle. This should not be interpreted as contradicting 
the first independent hypothesis. The assumption that 
escape was impossible is rooted in the location of grave 
markers. According to Fox, only light skirmishing marked 
113 
the early stages of the battle, granting Custer the liberty 
to continue offensive maneuvering in hopes of capturing as 
many Indians as possible. It was not until later in the 
battle, with the right wing collapsing and pressure on the 
left wing mounting, that Custer moved to the defense. From 
the time Custer moved to the defense, it appears that all 
escape routes were blocked. Consequently, the fact that 
Custer's left wing had few restrictions on their movement 
early in the battle does not detract from the notion that 
they could not escape when the tide turned against them. 
b. Custer Hill was the Fundamental End 
The grave markers across Custer Battlefield are 
helpful in reconstructing the action that took place there. 
Perhaps the most unique collection of grave markers is the 
cluster of over 50 that adorn the western slope of Custer 
Hill. While other groupings of grave markers indicate 
varying degrees of huddling by presumably terrified 
soldiers, no other location conveys desperation like Custer 
Hill. Other sectors of the battlefield can alternatively 
be interpreted as groups in flight or skirmish lines; and 
either way implies a degree, however slight, of hope. The 
50 troopers who died on Custer Hill are bunched together, 
leaving a sense of imminent implosion. There are no 
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discernable battle lines here, nor is there a trail of 
markers indicating an attempt to escape. The explanation 
for this is that they were completely surrounded. Fox 
relates this succinctly, as the left and right wings 
converged to Custer Hill under pressure from different 
directions. Fox posits that while any number of the markers 
to the west may represent troopers who fled the hill before 
the final slaughter, the final 50 were obviously unable or 
unwilling to follow their compatriots to the west. Rather 
than undermine the concept of total envelopment, Fox's 
explanation for the men who escaped Custer Hill actually 
strengthens it. Given the choice to flee danger, these men 
chose to move down toward the Indian village, the source of 
the warriors who were overrunning them. 
there was nowhere else to run. 
c. Spread Out by Design? 
This was because 
Fox's entire theory rests on two major points. 
First, the movements of the left wing beyond the northern 
boundaries of the battlefield were offensive maneuvers 
designed to survey the outlying edges of the Indian 
village. Second, the initial level of Indian activity was 
judged by Custer to be insignificant enough to let half of 
his battalion check the advancing infiltration. This 
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scenario explains the spread of Custer's battalion as a 
misreading of the strategic environment, not as a panicked 
rout from the outset. Fox's account of left wing offensive 
maneuvering beyond the battlefield fit well within the 
independent hypothesis of a deliberate spread of Custer's 
battalion. 
C. JOHN S. GRAY 
The chief underpinning of Gray's theory of the Battle 
of Little Big Horn is a time-motion analysis of primary 
accounts. Working under the commonsensical assumption that 
" ... anything that actually happened had to be possible", Gray 
set out to fashion a filter that would recognize those 
accounts that were consistent with likely rates of advance 
for a cavalry battalion, and were therefore feasible. The 
product of Gray's time-motion analysis is a meticulous 
account with a precise timeline. The Synchronization 
Matrix representing Gray's theory is Table 4-5. 
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Time 0 hr + :17 +: 20 +: 50 +1:25 
Custer's Dispatches Turn Split 
Actions/Decisions Reno battalion Battalion 
toward north, 
Indian behind 
camp bluffs on 
east bank 
Reno's Battalion Ride Initiate Retreat Effectively 
toward charge underway out of 
Indian on fight 
camp Indian 
camp 
Keogh's wing Halt to North North along 
water behind Nye-
horses bluffs Cartwright 
Ridge 
Yates' wing Halt to North Down 
water behind Medicine 
horses bluffs Tail Coulee 
Southern :Indian Massing at 
Contingent River near 
Medicine 
Tail Coulee 
Northern :Indian ? 
Contingent 
Table 4-5. Synchronization Matrix - Gray 
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Time +1:35 +1:42 +1:50 +2:03 
Custer's Suppress Reunite Reunited 
Actions/Decisions Indian with Yates battalion 
Pursuit of just south 
Yates' wing of Calhoun 
Hill 
Keogh's wing Suppressing West toward Reunited 
fire toward Calhoun battalion 
river Hill just south 
of Calhoun 
Hill 
Yates' wing Light Turn north Reunited 
skirmishing toward battalion 
over river Calhoun just south 
near mouth Hill under of Calhoun 
of Medicine mounting Hill 
Tail Coulee pressure 
Southern Indian Engaging Crossing Pressuring Pressing 
Contingent Yates' wing river to Yates' primarily 
at Medicine east bank flanks from the 




Northern Indian Flanking Flanking 
Contingent Maneuver to Maneuver to 
north north 
Table 4-5 continued. Synchronization Matrix - Gray 
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Time +2:07 +2:22 +2:30 +2:42 
Custer's Deploy Arrive at Massed on Annihilation 
Actions/Decisions rearguard, Custer Hill, Custer complete 
continue deploy Hill 
retreat reinforcements 




Reunited Battalion Lt. Retreating Some Annihilation 
Calhoun's toward Custer troopers complete 
company Hill, select escape 
deployed as companies sent Custer· 
rearguard to reinforce Hill 
rearguard toward 
river 
Southern Indian Heavily Enveloping Annihilation 
Contingent engaging rearguard, complete 
Custer's progressing 
rear flank toward Custer 
Hill 
Northern Indian Flanking Attacking Annihilation 
Contingent Maneuver to Custer Hill complete 
north position from 
northeast 
Table 4-5 continued. Synchronization Matrix - Gray 
1. Reconciling Gray's Theory with History 
Gray's work filters the profusion of primary accounts 
with his time-motion analysis. Using a standardized 
prescription for the advance of Custer's troops, which 
accounts for terrain, tactics, and the condition of 
Custer's men and horses, Gray devises an intricate re-
creation of the events on the battlefield. He also 
incorporates early archaeological surveys done on the 
battlefield (Gray, pp. 362-363). He chose to forego 
inclusion of the modern archaeological survey completed in 
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1985 (p. 384). Thus, there are important questions that 
can be posed from a historical perspective in relation to 
Gray's theory. 
a. Custer's Action after Reno's Departure 
A revealing disclosure in Gray's account of this 
period is the claim that Custer's battalion stopped to 
water their horses after Reno had been sent to charge the 
village. This seems to indicate no sense of urgency on 
Custer's part. This is wholly consistent with his 
subsequent action of probing the river at Medicine Tail 
Coulee, as opposed to charging the village at first 
opportunity. 
The battalion separation, which closely mirrors 
Fox's theory, is corroborated by the presence of government 
shell casings at both Medicine Tail Coulee and Nye-
Cartwright Ridge. It was still too early in the fight for 
the Indians to have brandished captured weapons from Reno's 
battalion, in any significant number, in this vicinity. 
The most feasible explanation for the presence of spent 
cartridges in these two locations is a two-element 
operation (Figure 4-7). On a related point, the separation 
of Custer's battalion enhances the notion that Calhoun Hill 
would serve as a rally point for the divided group. With 
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the Indians pressing Yates' wing from the south, Calhoun 
Hill is the first practical rally point which would have 
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Figure 4-7. Custer Battalion Separation and Reunion 
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b. The Retreat Across Custer Battlefield 
Much of Gray's recounting of the retreat across 
the battlefield is consistent with the explanation offered 
by Ambrose. The gist of the scenario is that Custer 
deployed Lt. Calhoun's company as rearguard, and proceeded 
to make way toward Custer Hill. Gray further explains that 
the weakening of Calhoun's line prompted subsequent 
deployments of companies from the vicinity of Custer Hill, 
back in the direction of Calhoun Hill. There seem to be 
two possible inconsistencies presented by this argument. 
First, the state of affairs that bring Custer 
over 1000 meters away from his rearguard, in search of the 
perfect defensive terrain, contradict a statement made by 
Gray regarding Custer's mindset at this time. "Custer must 
have realized that the adverse circumstances demanded that 
he keep his small force together, at least within mutual 
supporting distance."(Gray, p. 390) Gray has Custer 
leading most of the battalion toward a distant topographic 
feature, while sending reinforcements to his rearguard as 
an afterthought. In particular, there can be no mistaking 
that the Custer Hill and Calhoun Hill locations are not 
mutually supportive vantage points, especially in the case 
of an infiltrating mob of Indians from the south. This 
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criticism is dampened by the likelihood that communication 
was poor, and confusion high. It is entirely possible that 
as Custer pressed ahead to the most suitable defensive 
terrain, Lt. Calhoun dropped at the first decent defensive 
position available, unaware of Custer's distant objective. 
A consistent theme between Gray and Ambrose's 
accounts is the fact that if the scenario unfolded as they 
suggest, there was little, if any, tactical cohesion except 
for at Calhoun Hill. The 1 ines of grave markers along 
Custer Ridge, according to Gray, represent troopers sent to 
reinforce Calhoun's position and curtail the advance of the 
Indians from the south. The orientation of these grave 
markers show that no significant defensive deployment was 
accomplished, and the troopers there were cut down while in 
flight (Figure 4-8). As was stated, it is entirely 
possible that the presence of so many Indians overrunning 
Calhoun's position induced a panic throughout Custer's 
ranks. It is a little more difficult to accept that 
Calhoun's single company held comparatively intact, and the 








W::st to River 
Figure 4-8. Grave Markers versus Indian Routes 
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Another aspect of the Gray account that seems odd 
is the dearth of Indian casualties, generally estimated 
between 30 and 50. From the time Custer's battalion crests 
Calhoun Hill to the end of the battle is 35 minutes. This 
scenario leaves relatively little time for a slow, 
infiltrating envelopment of Custer's positions and 
concurrent attrition of his forces. Although the terrain 
around the battlefield is rife with gullies and ravines, 
with so little time allotted for the actual fighting the 
Indians would have had to initiate some substantial charges 
at Custer's positions. Considering the large number of 
Indians concentrated to the south, more Indian casualties 
inflicted in the early stages of the battle should be 
expected. Two possibilities diminish the force of these 
contemplations. First, efficient Indian shooting may have 
produced enough attrition in the early stages to induce an 
early panic. Second, the sheer number of Indians may have 
precipitated that panic without much attrition, and the 
ensuing chaos negated any tactical, cohesive advantage the 
troopers may have held. 
Finally, Gray's details relating to the final 
minutes of the battle wane to reluctant speculation. He 
refers to a discrete Indian group that attacks Custer Hill 
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from the northeast, and another that comes from the 
northwest to finish off the refugees from Custer Hill 
(Figure 4-9). This setting, as in Ambrose's account, make 








Figure 4-9. The Final Minutes 
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In sum, Gray's theory of the Battle of Little Big 
Horn merges well with the historical record. Regardless of 
the questions raised concerning the orientation of the 
grave markers, the explanations given by Gray for their 
disposition seem entirely feasible. 
2. Gray's Battle through Custer's Eyes 
The actions attributed to Custer, after his dispatch 
of Reno toward the Indian camp, reveal a lack of concern 
for enemy strength. Custer paused to water his battalion's 
horses, knowing he had a considerable distance to cover 
before he could engage the enemy. It seems likely that 
Custer believed Reno's attack would spur a slow moving 
retreat of the Indian village to the north. Taking this 
into consideration, the decision to split the battalion and 
probe the ford at Medicine Tail Coulee in search of a rear 
flank seems consistent. 
The next major decision made by Custer, to press north 
and reunite the battalion at the high ground around Calhoun 
Hill corresponds with his thoughts at the time. The high 
ground would afford him an advantageous position to repel 
the infiltrators, track the movement of the village, and 
wait for Benteen and the packtrain, who had orders to 
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hasten to Custer's position. Unlike Ambrose' s scenario, 
which had Custer's entire battalion retreating from the 
mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee, Gray's scenario of two 
companies making haste without much of a fight makes more 
sense. 
As Custer crested Calhoun Hill, his mind must have 
been calculating where the best site for his entire 
battalion to maneuver was. Either an improper fixation on 
Custer Hill, or a lack of communication with his rearguard 
led to the tactically unsound spread of the battalion over 
Custer Battlefield. The notion that Custer was retreating 
to save his own skin, and indifferent to the plight of his 
rearguard is diametrically opposed to his character. Thus, 
it seems the fog of war clouded the events long enough for 
Custer to allow his forces to become hopelessly strung out. 
This precluded his ability to bring the full combat power 
of the battalion to bear on the pursuing Indians. While 
this was obviously Custer's worst showing as a troop 
commander, the actions and decisions attributed to him by 
Gray are consistent with his daring history. 
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3. Reconciling Gray's Theory with the Independent 
Hypotheses 
Examining Gray's theory vis-a-vis the independent 
hypotheses developed in Chapter II will provide the final 
measure of feasibility. 
a. Escape Impossible 
Gray's theory, much like Fox's, maintains that 
Custer was probing north, not intending to attack 
immediately. Instead, Custer's plan was to seek out the 
best vantage point to envelop the Indian camp. The retreat 
enacted toward Calhoun Hill does not appear to be an all 
out attempt by Custer to flee the area. Initially, it 
seems that Custer was most likely looking for a place to 
hole up and wait for reinforcements. As the situation on 
the battlefield deteriorated, Custer made his way toward 
the infamous spot on the hill that bears his name. It is 
clear that any designs that Custer may have entertained 
regarding an escape, after beginning the ascent to Calhoun 
Hill, would have been futile. In summary, Gray's theory 
squares precisely with this hypothesis. 
b. Custer Hill was the Fundamental End 
The stragglers that left Custer Hill and fled to 
the west are not contraindicative of the hypothesis that 
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Custer Hill was the point in time and space where Custer's 
force ran out of options. With the massive throng of 
Indians kept in one general direction, Custer still had a 
chance, albeit remote, of either escaping or holding out. 
With the introduction of the Indian contingent from the 
north, all bets were off. Gray's theory shows, in concert 
with this hypothesis, that Custer Hill marked the end of 
hope for the troopers on the battlefield. 
c. A Deliberate Spread? 
Despite the fact that Gray contends that Custer 
approached Calhoun Hill with the intent of locating terrain 
suitable for "mutually supporting" battalion maneuvers (p. 
390), the spread of the battalion was either an accident or 
negligent. The negligence, if indeed the spread was 
deliberate, is apparent because of the inability of the 
companies making way for Custer Hill to support the 
rearguard. Gray indicates that the companies along Custer 
Ridge may have been backtracking to aid Calhoun's company. 
This appears to signify a mistaken spread by either an 
overeager lead element, or a wayward rearguard. In either 
case, the evidence provided by Gray points toward a gaffe 
in relation to the positioning of supporting units. While 
this seems feasible, the hypothesis that the spread of the 
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units was premeditated takes precedence in this portion of 
the analysis. Referring back to Custer's operational 
history, it seems unlikely he would be at the head of a 
retreat that left behind a paltry rearguard. It would be 
more consistent with his temperament to be at the head of a 
counterattack at the earliest opportunity. The notion that 
Custer spread his forces intentionally, within Gray's 
scenario, seems remote. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The examination of the three theories in Chapter IV 
demonstrated the analytical worth the techniques provided 
in the U. S. Army's FM 101-5. In particular, the 
Synchronization Matrix technique provided ·a flexible and 
efficient medium that could be readily modified from its 
original purpose of developing potential COAs into a useful 
tool to examine historical combat. The following 
discussion will evaluate the results of Chapter IV's 
analyses, and order Ambrose, Fox, and Gray's theories by 
degree of feasibility. Furthermore, the theory considered 
most feasible will supply a vehicle to support several 
theoretical "what-ifs". 
A. RANKING THE THEORIES 
Richard Allan Fox, Jr. has the distinct advantage of 
being involved, in a direct manner, with the revelations 
that the archaeological excavations of 1984-1985 uncovered. 
The access to this new information allowed Fox to liberate 
his thinking from the conventional assumptions that have 
stifled innovative thought in this genre. 
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It is clear that 
this fact contributes to his theory most closely merging 
with the combination of the historical record, Custer's 
disposition as a commander, and the independent hypotheses 
developed for this thesis. Gray rates a close second to 
Fox, with his only real shortcoming being an inconsistency 
with the independent hypothesis of a deliberate spread of 
Custer's forces across the battlefield. Ambrose finished 
last in the ranking, due to some inconsistencies with the 
historical record, Custer's temperament as a military 
commander, and the independent hypotheses. The discrete 
evaluation criteria are subsequently reviewed in order to 
identify the specific circumstances that led to this 
ranking. 
1. The Historical Record 
Fox sifted meticulously through the primary accounts 
in order to make sense out of their incongruous nature. 
His use of the grave markers in reconstructing the movement 
of Custer's forces across the battlefield is also 
persuasive. The actions attributed to Crazy Horse, while 
contradictory to the standard view of a protracted flanking 
maneuver, offer an explanation that is more compatible with 
past Indian actions in battle. Fox's theory allows Crazy 
Horse to lead an effective attack that indeed surprised and 
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overwhelmed Custer/ s forces from the rear 1 without having 
to consider the improbable persuasion of a thousand Indians 
to ride miles away from the battle to flank the troopers. 
There are no apparent inconsistencies between the factual 
historical record and FOX 1 S theory. 
Gray also did a fantastic job filtering the primary 
accounts through an independent assessment, with his time-
motion analysis. This technique permitted Gray to 
discount 1 further interpret/ and confirm many of the 
recollections of battle participants/ as well as the 
distant observations of Reno Hill veterans. While Gray 
neglected to specify the origin of the Indians who 
overwhelmed Custer Hill from the northeast 1 his account is 
feasible within the historical record/ as we know it. 
Ambrose utilized voluminous primary accounts to 
support his version of the events on Custer Battlefield. 
Perhaps the most striking weakness of his description is 
the disregard of artifacts that do not coincide with his 
story. Specifically, the government shell casings found 
well to the east of Medicine Tail Coulee indicate that/ in 
all likelihood/ Custer/ s battalion approached the Custer 
Battlefield in two discrete elements. The actual events on 
the battlefield seem feasible with regards to the location 
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of the grave markers. Ambrose takes the traditional view 
of Crazy Horse's involvement, as he recounts the celebrated 
"end-around" from the north. In light of Fox's novel 
revision of this flanking maneuver, the conventional scheme 
of Crazy Horse's involvement seems less likely. Of the 
three theories, Fox's appears to have the most inaccuracies 
in relation to the historical record. 
2. Custer's Disposition 
Fox and Gray both portray Custer in a manner most 
closely correlated with his history as a military fighting 
man. Both men correctly identified that Custer was more 
concerned with capturing the entire Indian village and less 
concerned with charging ahead to support Reno's attack. 
While Gray's account tends to suggest egregious errors in 
the maneuver of the battalion about Custer battlefield, 
those errors are no more serious than the errors suggested 
by Fox's far-flung offensive probe. The only appreciable 
disparity between the two appears to be a lack of offensive 
maneuvering by Custer In Gray's account, which seems out of 
character. 
Ambrose, on the other hand, attributes a ragged 
retreat to Custer, before any genuine fighting took place. 
Remember, Custer's entire battalion met the Indians at 
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Medicine Tail Coulee, and retreated without taking any 
casualties for close to a mile. While the retreat may make 
tactical sense, Custer's experience told him an Indian 
force would not stand up to the firepower of a cavalry 
unit. The disconnect here is that in Ambrose's scenario, 
Custer never initiated any offensive action. Of all the 
accounts, Ambrose's portrays Custer in a manner most 
inconsistent with his character. 
3. The Independent Hypotheses 
All of the theories met two of the criterion 
established from independent analysis. Gray, Fox, and 
Ambrose each portrayed the events on Custer Battlefield to 





over the apex of Custer Hill. 
of the authors represents the 
possibility for escape as impracticable. It was the final 
hypothesis, advocating a deliberate spread of Custer's 
forces across the battlefield that produced a distinction 
between the theories. Both Ambrose and Gray portray the 
spread of Custer battalion across Custer Battlefield as a 
product of confusion and panic. Only Fox paints a picture 
of calculated positioning. His explanation of a dual 
offensive/defensive operation explains the range between 
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the two wings of Custer's battalion, and satisfies the 
independent hypothesis. 
Given that Fox's theory of the Battle of Little Big 
Horn stood up to the evaluation criteria best, it is 
apparent that his theory can be considered the most 
feasible of the three. Gray's theory runs a close second, 
and as his discrepancies with the evaluation criteria are 
mostly in the conjectural realm, his theory can also be 
considered quite possible. Ambrose had some 
inconsistencies with the historical record, as well as 
other evaluation criteria. It seems unlikely that Ambrose 
portrays Custer's approach and initial skirmishing with the 
Indians correctly. 
B. RE-FIGHTING THE BATTLE OF LITTLE BIG HORN 
As was stated earlier, the final endeavor of this 
thesis will attempt to ascertain whether or not Custer 
could have emerged alive from the Battle of Little Big 
Horn. 
tested. 
Originally, three notional scenarios were to be 
After the analysis of each of the three theories, 
it is concluded that enacting a speculative retreat at an 
earlier stage of the battle within all of the scenarios 
138 
would be nonsensical. In Gray and Ambrose's theories, the 
retreat was initiated at the first sign of danger and any 
attempt push back the point in time Custer called for a 
retreat would appear senseless. In Fox's theory, it could 
be argued that Custer ignored considerable, impending 
danger when pushing on with his offensive probe to the 
north. However, altering the decision to probe north would 
stray too far afield from the scenario offered by Fox. 
Foregoing Custer's probe north would essentially transform 
Fox's theory into one approximately matching Gray's. The 
only appreciable difference would be a few extra moments 
before the pressure mounted on the southern flanks of the 
battlefield. Therefore, any chance for the battalion's 
escape would require Custer to enact a retreat before any 
serious danger was apparent. Being so incongruent with 
Custer's character as a troop commander, such an endeavor 
would be of no use. Overall, each of the theories has 
Custer effectively cut off from any feasible retreat path 
toward his other battalions after descending Medicine Tail 
Coulee. It is clear that Custer's fate was indeed sealed 
early on in the action. 
Nevertheless, two alternative scenarios will be 
reviewed in order to estimate their impact on the outcome 
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of this notional battle. The scenarios will progress from 
the least intrusive on history, to a complete revision of 
Custer's attack 'plan. 
1. Benteen to the Rescue 
The first hypothetical scenario is one that propels 
Benteen, with his 3 companies of approximately 125 men, 
past Reno's bloodied command and on to the Custer 
Battlefield. Many critics charge Benteen with indifference 
to Custer's appeal for reinforcements. These detractors 
contend that Benteen's willing disregard for Custer's 
orders contributed directly to the debacle at Little Big 
Horn. However, it is unclear if Benteen could have altered 
the outcome of the battle. The most accurate estimates 
regarding Benteen's itinerary have him arriving at Reno 
Hill at roughly the same time Custer is sending Yates' 
Battalion down Medicine Tail Coulee (Gray, pp. 272, 310). 
In order to test the feasibility of Benteen affecting the 
outcome of Custer's fight, it is valuable to display the 
speculative movements in a Synchronization Matrix (Figure 
5-:::1) . The time estimates used will be obtained from Gray's 
account. While Gray and Fox both estimate battle 
progression in similar time hacks, Gray's time-motion 
analysis accounts for Benteen's whereabouts in a much more 
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scrupulous manner. The rates of advance, which dictate the 
notional timeline, are also drawn from Gray's estimates in 
his study. 
Time 0 1:15 2:05 2:20 2:45 
Custer's Turn Arrive Calhoun Battalion Battle 
battalion north Medicine Hill and quickly over 





Benteen's Southern Arrive Arrive First 25 
battalion excursion Reno Medicine chance to minutes 
Hill Tail engage to become 





Figure 5-l. Synchronization Matrix of Benteen Rescue 
As can be seen in the matrix, if Benteen had not 
paused at all at Reno's position, he would have arrived at 
the flanks of the Indians attacking Calhoun Hill when the 
rout in that sector was already underway. The Indians 
would have already enveloped much of Custer Ridge as well. 
With circumstances already grim, no avenue to directly link 
up with Custer's battalion, and only 125 additional troops 
it is highly unlikely that Benteen could have prevented the 
disaster at Custer Battlefield. On the contrary, the most 
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likely outcome would have been the addition of another 125 
grave markers to the battlefield. 
2. Charge! 
The last alternative scenario to be discussed will be 
a notional charge, by the entire 7th Cavalry, over the route 
taken by Major Reno's battalion. This scenario presents 
what could be the best possible chance for victory that 
Custer could have hoped for. There are two advantages that 
this attack would have had over the actual battle. First, 
the most obvious advantage is simple numbers. As 
illustrated in a simple Lanchester combat model, smaller 
forces engaging a large force discretely will either suffer 
more losses, or die more quickly than if they were fighting 
in conjunction. (Giordano, pp. 411-419) 
Second, the terrain encountered by Reno during his 
foray toward the Indian camp was much more sui table for 
large-scale cavalry maneuvers than the ravines, gullies, 
and hills dotting the Custer Battlefield. Lastly, with no 
considerable terrain features between the troopers and the 
Indian village, the Indians may have felt that their women 
and children were more threatened, and possibly have begun 
to retreat with them. In the actual battle, Custer could 
not have made a charge at any part of the village without 
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negotiating difficult terrain and fording the river, which 
would have made such a charge very vulnerable. Reno's 
efforts were feeble at best, and certainly presented no 
significant threat to the Indians' families, but his 
terrain would have been conducive for such an attempt if 
the numbers were there. 
The prospects of survival, had Custer's regiment 
remained intact throughout the battle, seem quite good. 
While a victory, defined by Custer as capturing the entire 
village, seems unlikely, the prospect of living to fight 
again may not seem a bad alternative to Custer, given the 
luxury of hindsight. 
C. THE UTILITY OF WAR-GAMING 
The use of the U.S. Army's war-gaming methods, 
presented in FM 101-5, has proven an interesting, flexible 
means of examining historical combat. The advantage 
provided by the Synchronization Matrix is the concise 
representation of simultaneous, major actions. Viewing 
combat through this method allows for a more controlled, 
logical analysis of concurrent events. Furthermore, by 
modifying the Synchronization Matrix from its original 
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purpose, developing potential COAs, to a tool to examine 
previous operations, an innovative function for this war-
gaming method becomes evident. The examination of prior 
operations, via the Synchronization Matrix method, is 
opened up to the free reign of notional variations in 
tactics, strategy, and force structure within a controlled, 
coherent system of analysis. From the Battle of the Little 
Big Horn to the hostage rescue attempt over the desert in 
Iran, war-gaming can release lessons from the past to be 
incorporated into battles of the future. 
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